Viral clearance studies …. are they needed for proteins produced using bacterial or yeast fermentation processes?

Dr. Ray Nims

In E. coli or Pichia pastoris-based bioproduction of recombinant proteins, there are no suitable host cells for amplification of viruses that are infectious for humans. Bacteria such as E. coli and yeast such as P. pastoris can only support the growth of certain bacteriophage or yeast viruses, respectively. These types of viruses are not infectious for humans or animals.

The potential for viral infection of a bacterial cell process or a yeast cell process used for production of a recombinant protein is therefore a business risk, not a patient safety risk. This is the reason why case studies of bacteriophage infection of bacterial fermentation processes or of viral contamination of yeast cell processes have not appeared in the literature (or in the news). Unlike virus contamination of animal cell-based production processes, the events involving bacterial or yeast do not have patient safety implications. When a bacteriophage or yeast virus contamination occurs, manufacturers quietly go about the business of restarting the fermentation. Remediation and prevention of future occurrences is driven primarily by business concerns, as opposed to regulatory concerns.

Manufacturers of recombinant proteins produced using bacterial or yeast cell substrates are not required to conduct cell line viral testing (though phage induction studies may be performed as part of bacterial cell line characterization – to mitigate business risk!), nor are they required to conduct lot-by-lot viral testing of bulk harvest samples. Such requirements are mandated for production processes using animal or human cells. As the title of the document “Quality of Biotechnological Products: Viral Safety Evaluation of Biotechnology Products Derived from Cell Lines of Human or Animal Origin” indicates, the ICH Q5A (R1) guidance mandating such testing is clearly directed toward manufacturing processes utilizing the types of cells which may support growth of viruses infectious for human or animal cells. This ICH document also provides guidance on the conduct of viral clearance studies.

Viral clearance studies are intended to provide evidence of the ability of downstream purification steps of a manufacturing process to remove or inactivate viruses that potentially may contaminate the process, make their way into final product, and represent a health risk to patients. As such, the evaluation typically involves both relevant viruses (i.e., viruses that are known to contaminate these kinds of processes) and model viruses (i.e., viruses representative of the types of viruses that could contaminate these processes). In the case of bacteria- and yeast-based manufacturing processes, the relevant viruses (bacteriophage and yeast viruses, respectively) are not infectious for humans or animals. In addition, there are no model viruses that are capable of infecting these kinds of cells that are of concern for humans or animals. Therefore, viral clearance studies are typically not required or conducted.

Are there any circumstances where a bacterial or yeast fermentation process could be expected to harbor a virus capable of infecting humans? The only that I can imagine is a process utilizing primary or secondary animal-derived raw materials in rather large quantities. The worry would not be that viral amplification might occur, but that some carryover of surviving animal viruses to the final product might be possible. The use of such animal-derived materials by a manufacturer of a therapeutic protein must be justified based on risk analysis. If substantial risk is introduced by the use of such raw materials, then perhaps a raw material treatment approach would need to be validated.

In the absence of the use of animal derived materials or plant materials not subject to processing steps that would inactivate contaminating animal viruses, incorporation and validation of viral clearance steps into protein production processes using bacteria or yeast cell substrates is not expected, nor would this be of practical value in assuring patient safety.

Assessing rapid viral enumeration/detection systems

By Dr. Ray Nims

In a previous posting, we alluded to the recent availability of rapid methods for identification of viruses. These technologies, together with rapid methods for enumerating viruses, should greatly expedite the quantification and identification of viruses (and bacteriophage) as compared with the existing cell culture-based approaches.

Rapid enumeration technologies are intended to replace the cell-based infectivity endpoints such as plaque assays or tissue-culture infectious dose assays, which typically require 7-10 days for completion. The use of the rapid methods may be appropriate in cases where it is not necessary to determine the infectious titer of a virus stock. An example of this might be for monitoring the amplification of viruses for preparation of live or subunit vaccines. The particle enumeration technologies include those that specifically measure viral particles and those that measure particles in general. As shown in Table 1, the particle enumeration technologies are not specific to any given virus. These are not generally useful, therefore, for viral identification, although the particle detection method associated with the NanoSight system does allow for sizing of the particles. Viral particle size is a key attribute to be aware of when, for instance, attempting to identify an unknown viral contaminant.

Table 1. Characteristics of rapid viral enumeration/identification technologies

The quantitative polymerase chain reaction (Q-PCR) and universal biosensor (Ibis T5000) technologies represent approaches that are capable of providing information both on the relative quantity of a virus in a sample and its identity. The important difference between the two is that in the former case (Q-PCR), the user is typically evaluating the identity and or quantity of a virus which is reactive with the specific primers and probes used in the assay. From an identification standpoint then, the Q-PCR technique has typically been used to confirm whether an unknown virus is related to the virus for which the assay primers and probes was designed. The degree of relatedness required is determined by the specific primers and probes used in the assay, and may be either to the genus level or the species level. Efforts are being made to incorporate primers for more highly conserved sequences to allow for more broad coverage in Q-PCR assays intended for viral screening. In the case of the universal biosensor (Ibis T5000), an unknown virus in a sample may be simultaneously identified and quantified, as long as the virus is or is closely related to one for which mass spectrometry information is present in the software used for assay analysis. Quantification in either case is in genomic units, and as with the particle enumeration methods, the readout of the quantitative nucleic acid methods does not indicate whether the virus detected is infectious. An additional nucleic acid-based method that may prove useful, in cases where relatively rapid identification of an unknown viral contaminant is needed, is deep (massively parallel) sequencing. This method is more labor intensive (and perhaps costly) then the other quantitative nucleic acid methods described above, but has the advantage that it can provide information regarding the completeness (partial vs. full-length) of the viral genomic sequences detected. This approach has displayed utility in identifying a novel picornavirus in harbor seal samples, porcine circovirus in rotavirus vaccines, and a new parvovirus in bovine serum.

Microarray screening is a technology that may be used to rapidly identify (but not enumerate) an unknown virus in a sample, provided that a probe for the virus is part of the microarray chip. Some microarray chips intended for viral identification also contain probes for conserved viral genomic sequences. In this case, the microarray may identify a novel unknown virus, at least to the genus level. As with the other rapid methods that are based on presence of specific genomic material, the assay cannot discriminate between infectious and non-infectious virus.

See Table 1 for some of the important characteristics and limitations of each method. The use of the rapid methods discussed above and in Table 1 should reduce the time needed for viral quantitation from weeks to hours, and for identification of an unknown contaminant in a sample from months (or years) to one or more days. This should greatly facilitate the monitoring of viral proliferation in manufacturing processes and the investigation of viral contamination events.

Ridding serum of viruses with gamma irradiation: part 2

by Dr. Ray Nims

In a previous posting, we described the susceptibility of viruses from various families to inactivation in frozen serum treated with gamma irradiation (data from the literature). Gamma irradiation is a commonly employed risk mitigation strategy for biopharmaceutical manufacture, and indeed the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products in its Note for guidance on the use of bovine serum states that some form of inactivation (such as gamma irradiation) is expected. The use of non-treated serum in the production of biologics for human use must be justified, due to the potential for introducing a viral contaminant through use of this animal-derived material.

But how effective is this particular risk mitigation strategy? To answer this, we expressed the susceptibility to inactivation by gamma radiation for a series of 16 viruses in terms of log10 reduction in titer per kiloGray (kGy) of gamma radiation. With this value in hand, one may easily calculate the log10 reduction in titer of a given virus which might be expected following irradiation of frozen serum at any given kGy dose (serum is typically irradiated at a dose of 25-40 kGy).

The next step is to try to understand the results obtain with this relatively limited series of viruses, so that we may extrapolate the results to other viruses. If we take a look at the viral characteristics that might confer susceptibility to inactivation by gamma irradiation, will we find what we are looking for?

Viral characteristics that have been postulated to contribute to susceptibility or resistance to inactivation by gamma irradiation include: 1) radiation target size (genome size, particle size, genome shape, segmentation of the genome); 2) strandedness (in double stranded genomes the genomic information is recorded in duplicate, so loss of information on one strand may not be as damaging as it would be in the case of a single stranded genome); 3) presence or absence of a lipid envelope (non-enveloped viruses are resistant to a variety of chemical and physical inactivation approaches); and 4) genome type (RNA vs. DNA). The characteristics for our series of 16 viruses are displayed in the following table (click on table to enlarge).

For evaluating the contribution of radiation target size, we are able to make use of quantitative values available for each virus for genome size (in nucleotides) and particle size (in nm). Plotting genome size vs. log10 reduction in titer per kGy yields the results shown below. The coefficient of determination obtained is just 0.32, suggesting that factors other than (or in addition to!) genome size in nucleotides must be important..

A somewhat better concordance is obtained between particle size and log10 reduction in titer per kGy as shown below. The fit line in this case is non-linear, with a coefficient of determination of 0.60.

The contributions of genome type (RNA vs. DNA), genome strandedness, and lipid envelope (present or absent) to susceptibility to inactivation by gamma irradiation appear to be minimal, within this limited series of viruses. As a result, we are left with the conclusion that the most clear, albeit incomplete, determinant of susceptibility to inactivation by gamma irradiation appears to be particle size. This probably explains the resistance to inactivation displayed by the extremely small viruses such as circoviruses, parvoviruses, and caliciviruses. It is less clear why the polyomaviruses (e.g., SV-40 at 40-50 nm) are so resistant to gamma irradiation while certain of the picornaviruses (25-30 nm) are less resistant to inactivation. More work in this area is needed to better understand all of the factors that contribute to susceptibility to gamma radiation inactivation in viruses and bacteriophage.

< This information was excerpted in part from Nims, et al. Biologicals (2011) >

Small, non-enveloped viruses: number 1 threat to biologics manufacture

by Dr. Ray Nims

Perhaps surprisingly, few types of viruses have infected biologics manufacture since the 1980s when the first recombinant proteins began to be produced in mammalian cells. While the list of contaminating viruses has included some relatively large enveloped and non-enveloped viruses (Reovirus type 2, epizootic hemorrhagic disease virus, Cache Valley virus, human adenovirus), by far the most problematic contaminants have been the small non-enveloped viruses. Why? For the most part, the contaminations involving the larger viruses have been attributed to the use of non-gamma irradiated bovine serum or to operators conducting open vessel manipulations. Remediating the manufacturing processes to include gamma irradiation of the serum (or elimination of the use of serum altogether), and eliminating wherever possible open vessel operations should mitigate the risk of experiencing these viruses.

Now we come to the small non-enveloped viruses, the real problem. Foremost among these has been murine minute virus (MMV). This 20-25 nm non-enveloped parvovirus has infected biologics manufacturing processes using Chinese hamster cell substrates on at least four occasions, affecting at least three different manufacturers (Genentech, Amgen, and Merrimack). In each case, the source of the contamination has been unclear, making remediation of the processes difficult. Due to the ability of these viruses to survive on surfaces and their resistance to inactivation by detergents and solvents, eliminating the agent from contaminated facilities may require drastic measures such as fumigation with vaporous hydrogen peroxide .

A second problem virus is the 27-40 nm non-enveloped calicivirus, vesivirus 2117. This is the virus that was found to have infected the Genzyme Allston manufacturing facility in 2009. The same virus had appeared already once in the past, at a manufacturing facility in Germany. Both of the infected processes involved Chinese hamster production cells and both involved the use of bovine serum at some point in the manufacturing process. Whether or not the animal-derived material was the actual source of the infection was not proven in either case. Unfortunately, if the source was the bovine serum, gamma irradiation probably would not mitigate the risk, as gamma irradiation is less effective for inactivating the smaller non-enveloped viruses. This is another virus that may be able to survive on facility surfaces. As in the case with MMV, ridding a manufacturing facility of vesivirus may require entire facility fumigation with vaporous hydrogen peroxide, as was done at Genzyme.

Another problem virus is the 17-20 nm porcine circovirus that was found to contaminate a rotavirus vaccine in 2010. This virus was thought to have originated in contaminated porcine trypsin used in the manufacturing process. Wouldn’t this contaminant have shown up in the raw material testing done for the trypsin, or in the extensive cell bank testing required for vaccine production substrates? The answer is no. The circovirus would not have been detected using the 9CFR-based detection methods used for trypsin at this time (and at present). And the required testing for cell banks used to produce vaccines would not have detected this particular virus. To make matters worse, gamma irradiation of the trypsin would not be expected to inactivate this virus. How can we mitigate the risk of this virus going forward? As described in a previous posting, manufacturers may need to apply specific nucleic acid tests for the circovirus as part of the raw material release process for trypsin.

These and other small non-enveloped viruses represent the greatest risk for biologics manufacturing because they are more difficult to inactivate in raw materials, and more difficult to eradicate from the facility once infected, and because the source of the infection is not always clear. There must be analogous small-non-enveloped bacteriophage lurking out there that represent, for the same reasons, special threats to the fermentation industry.

Getting a grip on prophage

by Dr. Ray Nims

In a previous post, we discussed bacteriophage as a risk for the manufacture of biopharmaceuticals by bacterial fermentation. We mentioned briefly that bacteriophage may integrate within the genome of bacterial cells and that this may also represent a problem. Now we will explain why.

Bacteriophage are viruses that infect bacteria, and they have evolved two mutually exclusive strategies for survival. One involves a lytic growth cycle leading to death (lysis) of the host cell and release of progeny phage that may then infect additional host cells (so-called horizontal transmission). The other strategy is called lysogeny and involves integration of phage coding sequences into the host (bacterial) cell genome. The integrated phage is termed a prophage. This strategy for phage survival is referred to as vertical transmission since the phage genomic material is reproduced along with that of the host cell as the latter proliferates. Under certain circumstances, however, the integrated prophage can excise itself from the host cell chromosome in a process referred to as induction. The excised phage then may initiate a lytic infection of the host cell, causing all of the problems discussed in the previous post.

Illustration of a T4 phage infecting E. coli by Jonathan Heras

The relative success (i.e., from the perspective of the phage!) of the lytic vs. lysogenic survival strategies changes with the probability of host cell survival. Lysogeny appears to be a strategy that allows phage to persist during periods of low host cell availability or poor environmental (e.g., nutrient) conditions. Induction of prophage is an adaptation of the phage to host cell damage. This damage usually takes the form of a major stress to the host cell.

If stess can lead to prophage induction, the worry then becomes that some manipulation of a bacterial production cell during biopharmaceutical manufacture could lead to induction and initiation of a lytic phage infection. How can we assess and mitigate the potential for this to occur? There are two approaches: first, we can perform chemical or physical induction studies to determine the likelihood of encountering a prophage in a given production cell; and second, we can engineer the conditions of bacterial growth such that induction of a prophage is discouraged.

Phage induction studies may be performed on the bacterial production cell following initial engineering of the cell or during characterization of the cell bank. The inducing agent most often employed is mitomycin C. Other types of inducing agents (conditions) include carcinogens (such as the N-nitrosamines), hydrogen peroxide, high temperature, starvation, and UV radiation. The cells are treated with the inducing agent or condition, then one of various endpoints is used to detect the initiation of a lytic phage infection. These could include culture assays as well as molecular techniques such as PCR, microarray, or DNA chips.

Suppose you have an E. coli production cell harboring a problematic prophage. What can be done to discourage phage induction? Certain growth procedures have been shown to reduce spontaneous phage induction in E. coli cultures. These include using lower bacterial growth rates, replacement of glucose in growth medium with glycerol, and engineering the production cell through introduction of a plasmid conferring over-expression of the phage cI gene.

In summary, there are approaches that can identify the likelihood of encountering prophage induction from a bacterial production cell. The time to perform this type of testing is during development of the fermentation process (following the engineering of the production cell), or following banking of the production cell. If prophage induction appears to be a problem, bacterial growth procedures can help to reduce the potential. If this is not sufficient, the production cell may need to be re-engineered to produce a phage-resistant mutant.

Remember....bacteriophage are viruses too

by Dr. Ray Nims

Are you using bacterial cells to produce a biologic? Do not make the mistake of thinking that your upstream process is safe from infection by adventitious viruses. True, you are not required to test for the usual viruses of concern using a lot release adventitious virus assay. But bacterial production systems are susceptible to introduction of viruses just as mammalian cell processes are. In this case, the viruses just happen to be referred to as bacteriophage. Other than this, the putative contaminants have the same nasty property exhibited by viruses that can contaminate mammalian cell processes, that is … their small size (24-200 nm) allows them to readily pass through the filters used to “sterilize” process solutions. So media, buffers, induction agents, vitamin mixes, trace metal mixes, etc. that are fed into the fermenter without proper treatment can introduce a bacteriophage. Especially worrisome in this regard are raw materials that are generated through bacterial fermentation (such as amino acids, antibiotics). A fermenter infected with a lytic phage exhibits a clear signal that the bacterial substrate is unhappy. The trick then is to discover where the phage originated and to mitigate the risk of experiencing it again.

How can you mitigate the risk of experiencing a bacteriophage infection? Many of the same strategies used to protect mammalian cell processes may be applicable to the bacterial fermentation world. Raw materials and/or process solutions may be subjected to gamma-irradiation, to ultraviolet light in the C range, to prolonged heating or to high temperature short time treatment, to viral filtration, etc. In addition, mitigation of risk of bacteriophage contamination may require filtration of incoming gasses using appropriate filters. 

A sampling of the data available on inactivation of bacteriophage by various methods is shown in the table below. The literature is extensive, and as with viral inactivation, the inactivation of phage by certain of the methods (e.g., UVC, gamma-irradiation) may be dependent both upon the matrix in which the phage is suspended as well as the physical properties of the phage (e.g., genome or particle size, strandness, etc.). For fairly dilute aqueous solutions, gamma-irradiation, UVC treatment, or parvovirus filtration should represent effective inactivation/removal methods. HTST at temperatures effective for parvoviruses (102°C, 10 seconds) should be effective for most bacteriophage, although this is an area that needs further exploration.

Mitigating the risk of experiencing a bacteriophage contamination of a bacterial fermentation process is possible if one remembers that bacteriophage are similar to mammalian viruses. Strategies that are effective for small-non-enveloped mammalian viruses (i.e., the worst case for mammalian viruses) should also be effective for most bacteriophage.

A possible exception to this is prophage. In analogy with the presence of endogenous retroviruses in certain mammalian cells (i.e., rodent, human, monkey), there is a possibility of encountering integrated bacteriophage (prophage) in certain bacterial cell lines. Like endogenous retroviruses, prophage may result in the production of infectious particles under certain conditions. This phenomenon deserves some discussion, but this will have to be deferred to a future blog.

References: Purtel et al., 2006; Ward, 1979; Sommer et al., 2001.