Viral clearance studies …. are they needed for proteins produced using bacterial or yeast fermentation processes?

Dr. Ray Nims

In E. coli or Pichia pastoris-based bioproduction of recombinant proteins, there are no suitable host cells for amplification of viruses that are infectious for humans. Bacteria such as E. coli and yeast such as P. pastoris can only support the growth of certain bacteriophage or yeast viruses, respectively. These types of viruses are not infectious for humans or animals.

The potential for viral infection of a bacterial cell process or a yeast cell process used for production of a recombinant protein is therefore a business risk, not a patient safety risk. This is the reason why case studies of bacteriophage infection of bacterial fermentation processes or of viral contamination of yeast cell processes have not appeared in the literature (or in the news). Unlike virus contamination of animal cell-based production processes, the events involving bacterial or yeast do not have patient safety implications. When a bacteriophage or yeast virus contamination occurs, manufacturers quietly go about the business of restarting the fermentation. Remediation and prevention of future occurrences is driven primarily by business concerns, as opposed to regulatory concerns.

Manufacturers of recombinant proteins produced using bacterial or yeast cell substrates are not required to conduct cell line viral testing (though phage induction studies may be performed as part of bacterial cell line characterization – to mitigate business risk!), nor are they required to conduct lot-by-lot viral testing of bulk harvest samples. Such requirements are mandated for production processes using animal or human cells. As the title of the document “Quality of Biotechnological Products: Viral Safety Evaluation of Biotechnology Products Derived from Cell Lines of Human or Animal Origin” indicates, the ICH Q5A (R1) guidance mandating such testing is clearly directed toward manufacturing processes utilizing the types of cells which may support growth of viruses infectious for human or animal cells. This ICH document also provides guidance on the conduct of viral clearance studies.

Viral clearance studies are intended to provide evidence of the ability of downstream purification steps of a manufacturing process to remove or inactivate viruses that potentially may contaminate the process, make their way into final product, and represent a health risk to patients. As such, the evaluation typically involves both relevant viruses (i.e., viruses that are known to contaminate these kinds of processes) and model viruses (i.e., viruses representative of the types of viruses that could contaminate these processes). In the case of bacteria- and yeast-based manufacturing processes, the relevant viruses (bacteriophage and yeast viruses, respectively) are not infectious for humans or animals. In addition, there are no model viruses that are capable of infecting these kinds of cells that are of concern for humans or animals. Therefore, viral clearance studies are typically not required or conducted.

Are there any circumstances where a bacterial or yeast fermentation process could be expected to harbor a virus capable of infecting humans? The only that I can imagine is a process utilizing primary or secondary animal-derived raw materials in rather large quantities. The worry would not be that viral amplification might occur, but that some carryover of surviving animal viruses to the final product might be possible. The use of such animal-derived materials by a manufacturer of a therapeutic protein must be justified based on risk analysis. If substantial risk is introduced by the use of such raw materials, then perhaps a raw material treatment approach would need to be validated.

In the absence of the use of animal derived materials or plant materials not subject to processing steps that would inactivate contaminating animal viruses, incorporation and validation of viral clearance steps into protein production processes using bacteria or yeast cell substrates is not expected, nor would this be of practical value in assuring patient safety.

Assessing rapid viral enumeration/detection systems

By Dr. Ray Nims

In a previous posting, we alluded to the recent availability of rapid methods for identification of viruses. These technologies, together with rapid methods for enumerating viruses, should greatly expedite the quantification and identification of viruses (and bacteriophage) as compared with the existing cell culture-based approaches.

Rapid enumeration technologies are intended to replace the cell-based infectivity endpoints such as plaque assays or tissue-culture infectious dose assays, which typically require 7-10 days for completion. The use of the rapid methods may be appropriate in cases where it is not necessary to determine the infectious titer of a virus stock. An example of this might be for monitoring the amplification of viruses for preparation of live or subunit vaccines. The particle enumeration technologies include those that specifically measure viral particles and those that measure particles in general. As shown in Table 1, the particle enumeration technologies are not specific to any given virus. These are not generally useful, therefore, for viral identification, although the particle detection method associated with the NanoSight system does allow for sizing of the particles. Viral particle size is a key attribute to be aware of when, for instance, attempting to identify an unknown viral contaminant.

Table 1. Characteristics of rapid viral enumeration/identification technologies

The quantitative polymerase chain reaction (Q-PCR) and universal biosensor (Ibis T5000) technologies represent approaches that are capable of providing information both on the relative quantity of a virus in a sample and its identity. The important difference between the two is that in the former case (Q-PCR), the user is typically evaluating the identity and or quantity of a virus which is reactive with the specific primers and probes used in the assay. From an identification standpoint then, the Q-PCR technique has typically been used to confirm whether an unknown virus is related to the virus for which the assay primers and probes was designed. The degree of relatedness required is determined by the specific primers and probes used in the assay, and may be either to the genus level or the species level. Efforts are being made to incorporate primers for more highly conserved sequences to allow for more broad coverage in Q-PCR assays intended for viral screening. In the case of the universal biosensor (Ibis T5000), an unknown virus in a sample may be simultaneously identified and quantified, as long as the virus is or is closely related to one for which mass spectrometry information is present in the software used for assay analysis. Quantification in either case is in genomic units, and as with the particle enumeration methods, the readout of the quantitative nucleic acid methods does not indicate whether the virus detected is infectious. An additional nucleic acid-based method that may prove useful, in cases where relatively rapid identification of an unknown viral contaminant is needed, is deep (massively parallel) sequencing. This method is more labor intensive (and perhaps costly) then the other quantitative nucleic acid methods described above, but has the advantage that it can provide information regarding the completeness (partial vs. full-length) of the viral genomic sequences detected. This approach has displayed utility in identifying a novel picornavirus in harbor seal samples, porcine circovirus in rotavirus vaccines, and a new parvovirus in bovine serum.

Microarray screening is a technology that may be used to rapidly identify (but not enumerate) an unknown virus in a sample, provided that a probe for the virus is part of the microarray chip. Some microarray chips intended for viral identification also contain probes for conserved viral genomic sequences. In this case, the microarray may identify a novel unknown virus, at least to the genus level. As with the other rapid methods that are based on presence of specific genomic material, the assay cannot discriminate between infectious and non-infectious virus.

See Table 1 for some of the important characteristics and limitations of each method. The use of the rapid methods discussed above and in Table 1 should reduce the time needed for viral quantitation from weeks to hours, and for identification of an unknown contaminant in a sample from months (or years) to one or more days. This should greatly facilitate the monitoring of viral proliferation in manufacturing processes and the investigation of viral contamination events.

Porcine circoviruses, vaccines, and trypsin

By Dr. Ray Nims

It has now been more than a year since the announcements by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Merck of the presence of porcine circovirus (PCV) genomic material in their rotavirus vaccines.

The presence of the PCV viral sequences was, in both cases, provisionally attributed to the use of porcine trypsin during the culture of the cell substrates used in the manufacture of the vaccines. It has been reported that the genomic sequences were associated with low levels of infectious PCV in the GSK vaccine.     

As mentioned in a previous posting, an expected outcome of these disclosures was heightened regulatory expectations, going forward, for PCV screening of porcine raw materials and of Master and Working cell banks which were exposed to porcine ingredients (e.g., trypsin) at some point in their development. In January of 2011, the European Pharmacopoeia (Ph. Eur.) chapter 5.2.3 Cell substrates for production of vaccines for human use was revised to include the following instruction: “Trypsin used for the preparation of cell cultures is examined by suitable methods and shown to be sterile and free from mycoplasmas and viruses, notably pestiviruses, <circoviruses> and parvoviruses.” The addition of circoviruses to the list of viruses of concern (previously, mainly bovine viral diarrhea virus and porcine parvovirus) in Ph. Eur. 7.2 was not unexpected, based on the rotavirus vaccine experience.

A more broad expectation going forward may also be that vaccine and biologics production cell banks be proactively screened for unexpected, perhaps previously undetectable, viruses using detection techniques such as the deep sequencing used initially to detect the PCV in the GSK rotavirus vaccine. A related technique referred to as massively parallel sequencing (Massively Parallel Sequencing (MP-Seq), a New Tool For Adventitious Agent Detection and Virus Discovery) has been adopted for detection of viral contaminants in cells and viral seed stocks and for evaluating vaccine cell substrates by the contract testing organization BioReliance.

The more important sequella of the porcine circovirus disclosures may therefore be the proactive use of these new and powerful virus detection techniques for ensuring the viral safety of production cell banks, going forward.

A much improved Ph. Eur. Chapter 5.3.2

By Dr. Ray Nims

Vaccine manufacturers intending to market in the EU should be aware of a recent change in the European Pharmacopoeia (Ph. Eur.) chapter 5.2.3 Cell substrates for production of vaccines for human use. This chapter addresses the characterization of vaccine cell substrates. The section on Test Methods for Cell Cultures within the chapter includes an instruction to perform a co-cultivation study. The language previously was as follows: “Co-cultivation. Co-cultivate intact and disrupted cells separately with other cell systems including human cells and simian cells. Carry out examinations to detect possible morphological changes. Carry out tests on the cell culture fluids to detect haemagglutinating viruses. The cells comply with the test if no evidence of any extraneous agent is found.”

This section has been changed, as of Ph. Eur. version 7.2 effective in January of 2011, to the following: “Co-cultivation. For mammalian and avian cell lines, co-cultivate intact and/or disrupted cells separately with other cell systems including human cells and simian cells. For insect cell lines, extracts of disrupted cells are incubated with other cell systems, including human, simian, and at least 1 cell line that is different from that used in production, is permissible to insect viruses and allows detection of human arboviruses (for example BHK-21). Carry out examinations to detect possible morphological changes. Carry out tests on the cell culture fluids to detect haemagglutinating viruses, or on cells to detect haemadsorbing viruses. The test for haemagglutinating viruses does not apply for arboviruses to be detected in insect cells. The cells comply with the test if no evidence of any extraneous agent is found.”

So what is the big deal? Co-cultivation is a commonly employed technique for detecting infectious retrovirus in a cell bank. It is effective for this purpose because the chances for spread of infectious virus from test cell to indicator (host) cell are optimized by the cultivation of live cells of each kind in close proximity. The endpoint of the retrovirus assay, be it reverse transcriptase enzyme induction or rescue of an S+L- virus, is not interfered with by the presence of two cell types in one culture. The same is not always true for a co-cultivation of a test cell with an indicator (host) cell for detection of infectious virus when morphological changes (viral cytopathic effects) are one of the assay endpoints. The reason is that the diploid human cells (e.g., MRC-5 or WI-38) used as one of the indicator cells in such assays are rapidly displaced during co-cultivation with intact continuous cell lines used to produce vaccines, such as the simian cell Vero. The result of this is that within a short period of time in co-cultivation, the test culture is no longer predominated by the diploid cell but rather by the test cells and observation of the culture for cytopathic effects becomes problematic. Changing the language of this section to read “…co-cultivate intact and/or disrupted cells separately with other cell systems…” allows the user to eliminate the inoculation of intact test cells onto a diploid indicator cell.

The other useful modification to the language of this section is the following addition: “For insect cell lines, extracts of disrupted cells are incubated with other cell systems, including human, simian, and at least 1 cell line that is different from that used in production, is permissible to insect viruses and allows detection of human arboviruses (for example BHK-21).” Testing of insect cells for extraneous virus is only marginally effective when it is conducted per the usual method of inoculating another insect cell. Why? The insect cells that are available are most commonly suspension cultures, making observation for cytopathic effect problematic. The extraneous viruses that are of most concern for an insect production cell are the arboviruses (viruses transmitted via insect vectors). It has been known for some time that the Syrian hamster cell line BHK-1 is an excellent host cell for detecting arboviruses. The new language in this section of Ph. Eur. chapter 5.2.3 now clears the way for the use of the monolayer BHK-1 cell line to be used for the testing of insect cells for extraneous virus. In this regard the Ph. Eur. chapter is now more closely aligned with the World Health Organization’s 2009 Evaluation of cell substrates for the production of biologicals: revision of WHO recommendations. The latter has the following passage: "For instance, in the case of insect cell substrates, certain insect cell lines may be used for detection of insect viruses, and BHK cells may serve for the detection of arboviruses."

   

Taken together, the recent changes to Ph. Eur. Chapter 5.2.3 greatly improve the chapter and the viral safety testing of vaccine production cell banks specifically proscribed within it.

Rapid Identification of Viral Contaminants, Finally

By Ray Nims, Ph.D.


There was a time, not long ago, when it might take months to years to identify a viral contaminant isolated from a biological production process or from an animal or patient tissue sample. The identification process took this long because it involved what I have referred to as the “shotgun approach”, or it involved luck.

Let’s start with luck. That is probably the wrong term. What I mean by this is that there have been instances where an informed guess has led to a fairly rapid (i.e., weeks to months) identification of a contaminant. For instance, our group at BioReliance was able to rapidly identify contamination with REO virus (REO type 2 actually) and Cache Valley virus  because we had observed these viruses in culture previously and because these viruses had unique properties (a unique cytopathic effect in the case of REO and a unique growth pattern in the case of Cache Valley virus). The time required to identify these viruses consisted of the time required to submit and obtain results from confirmatory PCR testing for the specific agents.

The first time we ran into Cache Valley virus, however, it was a different story. This was, it turns out, the first time that this particular virus had been detected in a biopharmaceutical bulk harvest sample. In this case, we participated in the “shotgun approach” that was applied to the identification of the isolate. The “shotgun approach” consisted of utilizing any detection technique available at the lab, namely, in vitro screening, bovine screening, application of any immunofluorescent stains available, and transmission electron microscopy (TEM). The TEM was helpful, as it indicated a 80-100 nm virus with 7-9 nm spikes. A bunyavirus-specific stain showed positive, and eventually (after months of work), sequencing and BLAST alignment was used to confirm the identity of the virus as Cache Valley virus.

The “shotgun approach” was subsequently applied to a virus isolated from harbor seal tissues, with no identity established as a result. After approximately a year of floundering using the old methods, the virus was eventually found to be a new picornavirus (Seal Picornavirus 1).  How was this accomplished? During the time between the identification of the Cache Valley virus and the seal virus, a new technology called deep sequencing became available. Eric Delwart’s group used the technique to rapidly identify the virus to the species level. As this was the first time this particular picornavirus had ever been detected, deep sequencing is likely the only method that would have been able to make the identification.

Deep (massively parallel) sequencing is one of a few new technologies that will make virus isolate identification routine and rapid in the future. It has been adopted for detection of viral contaminants in cells and viral seed stocks and for evaluating vaccine cell substrates by BioReliance.The other is referred to as the T5000 universal biosensor. Houman Dehghani’s group at Amgen has been characterizing this methodology as a rapid identification platform for adventitious agent contaminations.  Each technology has its advantages. Deep sequencing is more labor intensive, but has the ability to indicate (as described above) a new species. The universal biosensor can both serve as a detection method and as an identification method. Both can identify multiple contaminants within a sample.

Since identification of an adventitious viral contaminant of a biopharmaceutical manufacturing process is required for establishment of root cause, for evaluating effectiveness of facility cleaning procedures and viral purification procedures, and for assuring safety of both workers and patients, it is critical that the identification of a viral isolate is completed accurately and rapidly. Happily, we now have the tools at hand to accomplish this.

Small, non-enveloped viruses: number 1 threat to biologics manufacture

by Dr. Ray Nims

Perhaps surprisingly, few types of viruses have infected biologics manufacture since the 1980s when the first recombinant proteins began to be produced in mammalian cells. While the list of contaminating viruses has included some relatively large enveloped and non-enveloped viruses (Reovirus type 2, epizootic hemorrhagic disease virus, Cache Valley virus, human adenovirus), by far the most problematic contaminants have been the small non-enveloped viruses. Why? For the most part, the contaminations involving the larger viruses have been attributed to the use of non-gamma irradiated bovine serum or to operators conducting open vessel manipulations. Remediating the manufacturing processes to include gamma irradiation of the serum (or elimination of the use of serum altogether), and eliminating wherever possible open vessel operations should mitigate the risk of experiencing these viruses.

Now we come to the small non-enveloped viruses, the real problem. Foremost among these has been murine minute virus (MMV). This 20-25 nm non-enveloped parvovirus has infected biologics manufacturing processes using Chinese hamster cell substrates on at least four occasions, affecting at least three different manufacturers (Genentech, Amgen, and Merrimack). In each case, the source of the contamination has been unclear, making remediation of the processes difficult. Due to the ability of these viruses to survive on surfaces and their resistance to inactivation by detergents and solvents, eliminating the agent from contaminated facilities may require drastic measures such as fumigation with vaporous hydrogen peroxide .

A second problem virus is the 27-40 nm non-enveloped calicivirus, vesivirus 2117. This is the virus that was found to have infected the Genzyme Allston manufacturing facility in 2009. The same virus had appeared already once in the past, at a manufacturing facility in Germany. Both of the infected processes involved Chinese hamster production cells and both involved the use of bovine serum at some point in the manufacturing process. Whether or not the animal-derived material was the actual source of the infection was not proven in either case. Unfortunately, if the source was the bovine serum, gamma irradiation probably would not mitigate the risk, as gamma irradiation is less effective for inactivating the smaller non-enveloped viruses. This is another virus that may be able to survive on facility surfaces. As in the case with MMV, ridding a manufacturing facility of vesivirus may require entire facility fumigation with vaporous hydrogen peroxide, as was done at Genzyme.

Another problem virus is the 17-20 nm porcine circovirus that was found to contaminate a rotavirus vaccine in 2010. This virus was thought to have originated in contaminated porcine trypsin used in the manufacturing process. Wouldn’t this contaminant have shown up in the raw material testing done for the trypsin, or in the extensive cell bank testing required for vaccine production substrates? The answer is no. The circovirus would not have been detected using the 9CFR-based detection methods used for trypsin at this time (and at present). And the required testing for cell banks used to produce vaccines would not have detected this particular virus. To make matters worse, gamma irradiation of the trypsin would not be expected to inactivate this virus. How can we mitigate the risk of this virus going forward? As described in a previous posting, manufacturers may need to apply specific nucleic acid tests for the circovirus as part of the raw material release process for trypsin.

These and other small non-enveloped viruses represent the greatest risk for biologics manufacturing because they are more difficult to inactivate in raw materials, and more difficult to eradicate from the facility once infected, and because the source of the infection is not always clear. There must be analogous small-non-enveloped bacteriophage lurking out there that represent, for the same reasons, special threats to the fermentation industry.

Manufacturing Biologics with CHO Cells? What’s the Risk for Viral Contamination?

by Dr. Ray Nims

Chinese hamster ovary (CHO) cells are frequently used in the biopharmaceutical industry for the manufacture of biologics such as recombinant proteins, antibodies, peptibodies, and receptor ligands. One of the reasons that CHO cells are often used is that these cells have an extensive safety track record for biologics production. This is considered to be a well-characterized cell line, and as a result the safety testing required may be less rigorous in some respects (e.g., retroviral safety) than that required for other cell types. But how susceptible is the cell line to viral contamination?

There are a couple of ways of answering this question. One way is to examine, in an empirical fashion, the susceptibility of the cell type to productive infection by model exogenous viruses. This type of study has been conducted at least three times over the past decades by different investigators. Wiebe and coworkers (In: Advances in Animal Cell Biology and Technology for Bioprocesses. Great Britain, 1989; 68-71) examined over 45 viruses from 9 virus families for ability to infect CHO-K1 cells, using immunostaining and cytopathic effect to detect infection. Only 7 of the viruses (Table 1) were capable of infecting the cells. Poiley and coworkers (In Vitro Toxicol. 4: 1-12, 1991) followed with a similar study in which 9 viruses from 6 families were evaluated for ability to infect CHO-K1 cells as detected by cytopathic effect, hemadsorption, and hemagglutination. This study did not add any new viruses to the short list (Table 1). The most recent study was conducted by Berting et al. This study involved 14 viruses from 12 families. The viruses included a few known to have contaminated CHO cell-derived biologics in the past two decades, and therefore did add some new entities to the list in Table 1. Still, the list of viruses that are known to replicate in CHO cells is relatively short.

Chinese hamster cells possess an endogenous retrovirus which expresses its presence in the form of retroviral particles, however these particles have been consistently found to be non-infectious for cells from other animals, including human cells. This endogenous retrovirus therefore does not present a safety threat (Dinowitz et al. Dev. Biol. Stand. 76:210–207, 1992).

A second way of looking at the question of viral susceptibility of CHO cells is to examine the incidence and types of reported viral contaminations of manufacturing processes employing CHO cell substrates. This subject has been reviewed a number of times, most recently by Berting et al. The types of viral contaminants fill a fairly short list (Table 2). In most cases, the contaminations have been attributed to the use of a contaminated animal-derived raw material, such as bovine serum.

Sources: Rabenau et al.1993; Garnick 1996; Oehmig et al., 2003; Nims Dev. Biol. 123:153-164, 2006; Nims et al., 2008; Genzyme 2009..

Considering the frequency with which CHO cell substrates have been used in biologics production, this history of viral contamination is remarkably sparse. This is further testament to the overall safety of this particular cell substrate.

FDA to viral vaccine makers: it's time to update viral testing methods

By Dr. Ray Nims

If you have been following the recent (2010) unfolding of the discovery of porcine circovirus DNA contamination in rotavirus vaccines from GSK and Merck, you may not be surprised to hear that the FDA has asked viral vaccine manufacturers to outline, by October, their plans to update their testing methodologies to prevent future revelations of this type.
 
I had predicted earlier that biologics manufacturers would be asked to provide evidence, going forward, that their porcine raw materials (trypsin being the most common) are free of porcine circovirus. This testing has not been manditory in the past, but adding this to the porcine raw material virus screening battery moving forward is a prudent action in light of the recent rotavirus vaccine experience.

The FDA has appropriately gone a little farther in it's request to the viral vaccine manufacturers. The regulators would like to assure that the future will not bring additional discoveries of viral contaminants in licensed vaccines, and the best way to accomplish this at the moment appears to be to request implementation of updated viral screening methodologies. Does this mean that viral vaccine makers will need to employ deep sequencing on a lot-by-lot basis? Most likely not. It appears that reliance on the in vivo and in vitro virus screening methods which have been the gold standards since the 1980s will, however, no longer be sufficient. So what does this leave us with? What FDA appears to be asking for is a relatively sensitive universal viral screening method.

The in vivo and in vitro methods were, until now, the best option for this purpose. These methods detect infectious virus only and depend upon the ability of the virus to cause an endpoint response in the system (cytopathic effect, hemagglutination, hemadsorption, or pathology in the laboratory animal species used). So viral genomic material would not be detected, and the methods have had to be supplemented with specific nucleic acid-based tests for viruses which could not otherwise be detected (e.g., HIV, hepatitis B, human parvovirus B9, porcine circovirus).

Some options for sensitive and universal viral screening methods which might fit the requirements include DNA microarrays and universal sequencing methods performed on cell and viral stocks. The latter technology may be preferable, as microarrays are constructed to detect known viruses, while the desire is that the technology be universal in the sense that it detect both known and unknown viruses. Such a test will provide additional assurance that the virus and cell banks used to manufacture viral vaccines do not harbor a viral contaminant.

Other universal viral screening methods which are less labor intensive than the sequencing technologies may be developed in the near future and addition of one of these to the release testing battery for viral vaccine lots may need to be considered in satisfying the FDA's goals.

Is Clarence calculating clearance correctly?

by Dr. Ray Nims

As pointed out by Dr. Rudge in a recent posting “Do we have clearance, Clarence?”, spiking studies conducted for the purpose of validating impurity clearance are often done at only one spiking level (indeed often at the highest possible impurity load attainable). This is especially true for validation of adventitious agent (virus and mycoplasma) clearance in downstream processes. The studies are done in this way in order to determine the upper limit of agent clearance (in terms of log10 reduction) by the process. Such log10 reduction factors from individual process steps are then summed in order to determine the overall capability of the downstream processes to clear adventitious agents. The regulatory agencies have fairly clear expectations around such clearance capabilities which must generally be met by biologics manufacturers.

The limiting factor in such clearance studies is typically the amount or titer of the agent that is able to be spiked into the process solution, which is determined by: 1) the titer of the stock used for spiking, and 2) the maximum dilution of the process solution allowed during spiking (typically 10%). Under these circumstances, as Scott points out, there is a possibility that the determined clearance efficiency (i.e., the percentage of the load which is cleared during the step) is an underestimate of the actual clearance that might be obtained at lower impurity loading levels.

Adventitious agent clearance is comprised of two possible modalities, removal and inactivation. Removal refers to physical processes designed to eliminate the agent from the process solution, usually through filtration or chromatography. Removal efficiency through filtration would not be expected to display variability based on impurity loading. On the other hand, chromatographic separation of agents (by, for example, ion-exchange columns) may display saturation at the highest loadings, and therefore use of the highest possible loading levels may result in underestimates of removal efficiency at lower (i.e., more typical) impurity levels.

Inactivation refers to physical or chemical means of rendering the agent non-infectious. Agent inactivation is not always a simple, first-order reaction. It may be more complex, with a fast phase 1 stage of inactivation followed by a slow phase 2 stage of inactivation. An inactivation study is planned in such a way that samples are taken at different times so that an inactivation time curve can be constructed. As with removal studies, the highest possible impurity levels are typically used to determine inactivation kinetics.

Source: Omar et al. Transfusion 36:866-872, 1996

While the information obtained through clearance studies of this type may be incomplete from the point of view of understanding the relationships between impurity loading levels and clearance efficiency, the results obtained are consistent with the regulatory expectation that the clearance modalities be evaluated under worst-case conditions. Therefore, at least in the case of adventitious agent clearance validation, I would say that Clarence is calculating clearance correctly!

Do We Have Clearance, Clarence?

By Dr. Scott Rudge

As in take offs and landings in civil aviation, the ability of a pharmaceutical manufacturing process to give clearance of impurities is vital to customer safety. It’s also important that clearance mechanism be clear, and not confused, as the conversation in the classic movie “Airplane!” surely was (and don’t call me Shirley).

There are two ways to demonstrate clearance of impurities.

The first is to track the actual impurity loads. That is, if an impurity comes into a purification step at 10%, and is reduced through that step to 1%, then the clearance would typically be called 1 log, or 10 fold.

The second is to spike impurities. This is typically done when an impurity is not detectable in the feed to the purification step, or when, even though detectable, it is thought desirable to demonstrate that even more of the impurity could be eliminated if need be.

The first method is very usable, but suffers from uneven loads. That is, batch to batch, the quantity and concentration of an impurity can vary considerably. And the capacity of most purification steps to remove impurities is based on quantity and concentration. Results from batch to batch can vary correspondingly. Typically, these results are averaged, but it would be better to plot them in a thermodynamic sense, with unit operation impurity load on the x-axis and efflux on the y-axis. The next figures give three of many possible outcomes of such a graph.

In the first case, there is proportionality between the load and the efflux. This would be the case if the capacity of the purification step was linearly related to the load. This is typically the case for absorbents, and adsorbents at low levels of impurity. In this case (and only this case, actually) does calculating log clearance apply across the range of possible loads. The example figure shows a constant clearance of 4.5 logs.

In the second case, the impurity saturates the purification medium. In this case, a maximum amount of impurity can be cleared, and no more. The closer to loading at just this capacity, the better the log removal looks. This would be the point where no impurity is found in the purification step effluent. All concentrations higher than this show increasing inefficiency in clearance.

In the third case, the impurity has a thermodynamic or kinetic limit in the step effluent. For example, it may have some limited solubility, and reaches that solubility in nearly all cases. The more impurity that is loaded, the more proportionally is cleared. There is always a constant amount of impurity recovered.

For these reasons, simply measuring the ratio of impurity in the load and effluent to a purification step is inadequate. This reasoning applies even more so to spiking studies, where the concentration of the impurity is made artificially high. In these cases, it is even more important to vary the concentration or mass of the impurity in the load, and to determine what the mechanism of clearance is (proportional, saturation or solubility).

Understanding the mechanism of clearance would be beneficial, in that it would allow the practitioner to make more accurate predictions of the effect of an unusual load of impurity. For example, in the unlikely event that a virus contaminates an upstream step in the manufacture of a biopharmaceutical, but the titer is lower than spiking studies had anticipated, if the virus is cleared by binding to a resin, and is below the saturation limit, it’s possible to make the argument that the clearance is much larger, perhaps complete. On the other hand, claims of log removal in a solubility limit situation can be misleading. The deck can be stacked by spiking extraordinary amounts of impurity. The reality may be that the impurity is always present at a level where it is fully soluble in the effluent, and is never actually cleared from the process.

Clearance studies are good and valuable, and help us to protect our customers, but as long as they are done as single points on the load/concentration curve, their results may be misleading. When the question comes, “Do we have clearance, Clarence?” we want to be ready to answer the call with clear and accurate information. Surely varying the concentration of the impurity to understand the nature of the clearance is a proper step beyond the single point testing that is common today.

And stop calling me Shirley.

The nuts and bolts of retrovirus safety testing

by Dr. Ray Nims


Retroviruses may integrate into the genome of host animals. For this reason they are often referred to as endogenous viruses. Viral particles may or may not be expressed in the host cell. Expressed viruses may be infectious or non-infectious, and infectious virus may have tropism for (ability to infect) the same or different animal species relative to the host cell of origin. Infection results from a process of reverse transcription of the viral RNA leading to proviral DNA. To accomplish this, retroviruses have a specialized enzyme known as reverse transcriptase. Through this process (see figure below), the infected cell may be enlisted to produce viral progeny. Certain of the retroviruses are known to be oncogenic (e.g., human T-lymphotropic virus 1, feline leukemia virus, Raus sarcoma virus, etc.). Other retroviruses are of concern as a result of disease syndromes caused in humans (e.g., human immunodeficiency virus 1 in acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, and the possible role of xenotropic murine leukemia virus-related virus in chronic fatigue syndrome). From a biosafety standpoint, there is a worry that under some conditions, integrated viruses in cell substrates employed to produce biopharmaceuticals which do not normally express their presence may be induced to produce infectious particles.

Source: AccessExcellence

Retrovirology safety testing for biologics manufacture can be confusing to those not familiar with the subject. Here is a brief overview.

Demonstrating retroviral safety typically involves a combination of the following three components:
• detecting infectious retrovirus through cell culture assays (XC plaque, cocultivation with mink lung or Mus dunni cells, etc.).
• measuring reverse transcriptase enzyme activities either through tritiated thymidine incorporation into templates, or through product amplification (PCR) techniques (PERT, etc.). This is not required if infectious retrovirus is detected.
• Visualizing and enumerating retroviral particles in supernatants or in fixed cells using transmission electron microscopy.

The various assays are applied during cell bank characterization (including end of production cell testing), during evaluation and validation of purification processes, and in some instances, as bulk harvest lot-release assays (results from 3 lots at pilot or commercial scale are submitted with the marketing application). For processes using well-characterized rodent cells known to contain endogenous retrovirus (CHO, C127, BHK, murine hybridoma), retroviral infectivity testing of the processed bulk is not required provided that adequate downstream clearance of the particles has been demonstrated.

Infectivity testing can be particularly confusing, due to the variety of cell-based assays employed. These include both direct and indirect assays. An example of a direct assay is the XC-plaque assay for ecotropic (a term meaning the virus is infectious for mouse cells) murine retroviruses. By definition, therefore, this would only be used to assay production cells of mouse origin.

Indirect assays are those in which a second endpoint is required to assess positive or negative outcome. Indirect assays include the various co-cultivation assays in which the test cells are co-cultivated with host cells such as mink lung, Mus dunni, and any of a number of human cells (see Table 4 within USP <1237> Virology Tests for a list of commonly used host cells). The indirect assays are performed to detect xenotropic retroviruses (retroviruses which are capable of infecting only animals other than the species of origin). The secondary endpoints used to assess outcome include reverse transcriptase activity, sarcoma virus rescue (S+L- focus formation assays), or enzyme immunoassay. The indirect assays are used in the retrovirus testing of mouse, hamster, monkey, and human production cell substrates. The selection of the host cell for the cocultivation assay is dependent upon the species of origin of the production cell, recognizing that cocultivation host cells from a species other than that of the production cells must be used. For production processes using rodent or other non-human cells, one or more human host cells are typically used for the cocultivation assay, as xenotropic retroviruses infectious for human cells are of obvious concern.

Still confused? Don’t worry. An individual with virology testing expertise can assist in designing the appropriate retrovirus testing battery for your biologic.

Using porcine trypsin in biologics manufacture?

by Dr. Ray Nims

On March 22, 2010, a press release from GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) announced that porcine circovirus 1 (PCV 1) DNA had been detected in their rotavirus vaccine. On May 6, Merck disclosed that it had found DNA fragments of both PCV types 1 and 2 in its rotavirus vaccine. The PCV 2 findings in Merck's vaccine may be of greater concern, due to the fact that this virus causes disease in pigs, while PCV 1 apparently does not. However, the relative amounts of PCV DNA found in the GSK vaccine appear to be much greater (the lab discovering the PCV DNA in the GSK vaccine did not detect any in the Merck vaccine), and the worry in this case is that some of the genomic material may be associated with infectious PCV 1 virus. In both cases, the presence of the PCV genomic material has been attributed to the use of porcine trypsin at some point in the vaccine manufacturing process.


The FDA convened an advisory committee meeting on May 7th to discuss the findings of PCV DNA in the two licensed rotavirus vaccines. What was the result of the advisory committee meeting? The advisory committee felt that the benefits of the rotavirus vaccines clearly outweigh the risks. This, added to the fact that there appears to be little human health hazard associated with these viruses, led to the FDA clearing the two vaccines for continued use on May 14th. The product labels will be updated to reflect the presence of the PCV DNA in these products. In the longer term, these products may need to be "reengineered" to remove the PCV DNA. This may involve the preparation of new Master and Working cell banks and thus will take some time.

Another likely outcome of the advisory committee’s meeting may be heightened expectations, going forward, for PCV screening of porcine raw materials and of Master and Working cell banks which were exposed to porcine ingredients (e.g., trypsin) at some point in their development. Porcine-derived raw materials which are used in the production of biologics are to be tested per 9 CFR 113.53 Requirements for ingredients of animal origin used for production of biologics for a variety of viruses of concern. In the case of ingredients of porcine origin, those viruses of concern are listed in 9 CFR 113.47 Detection of extraneous viruses by the fluorescent antibody technique. These include rabies, bovine viral diarrhea virus, REO virus, porcine adenovirus, porcine parvovirus, transmissible gastroenteritis virus, and porcine hemagglutinating encephalitis virus. While porcine circovirus may not be specifically mentioned in the 9 CFR requirements, it will be prudent to add a nucleic acid-based assay for detection of this virus to the porcine raw material testing battery going forward. Similarly, Master and Working cell banks exposed to porcine raw materials (e.g., trypsin) during their developmental history should be assayed for PCV prior to use.

Routine nucleic acid-based testing for PCV should detect the genomic sequences for this virus should intact infectious or non-infectious PCV be present in the test materials. Now that this virus is one of concern to the FDA and to the public, performing the appropriate raw material and cell bank testing for it will most likely become an expectation for vaccine and biologics manufacturers.

Oops, adventitious viral DNA fragments in a vaccine

by Dr. Ray Nims

On March 22, 2010, a press release from GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) announced that DNA from porcine circovirus had been detected in their rotavirus vaccine. According to GSK, the DNA ”was first detected following work done by a research team in the US using a novel technique for looking for viruses and then confirmed by additional tests conducted by GlaxoSmithKline”. As a result of this finding, the FDA “is recommending that US clinicians and public health professionals temporarily suspend the use of Rotarix as a precautionary measure. The FDA have also stated that they intend to convene an advisory committee, within approximately four to six weeks, to review the available data and make recommendations on rotavirus vaccines licensed in the USA. The FDA will also seek input on the use of new techniques for identifying viruses in vaccines.” The EMEA, on the other hand, does not appear to consider this finding to be a safety concern, citing the fact that porcine circovirus is not infectious for human cells and does not cause disease in humans.

Porcine circovirus

Source: Meat and Livestock Commission, UK

What is porcine circovirus? Porcine circovirus (PCV) is a member of the family Circoviridae, among the smallest of the known animal DNA viruses. It is approximately 17 nm in diameter, non-enveloped, with icosahedral symmetry. The virus was originally identified as a noncytopathic contaminant of the PK-15 porcine kidney cell line (Tischer et al., Zentralblatt Bakt Hyg A 226:153-167, 1974). Like many very small, non-enveloped viruses, PCV represents a challenge for removal and inactivation.

Why is this finding coming to light now, or stated another way, why wasn’t the PCV DNA detected when the vaccine was initially tested and approved for human use? The press release wasn’t specific as to method used. It has subsequently been revealed, however,  that these fragments were detected using sequence-independent amplification (deep sequencing; or as Eric Delwart calls it, metagenomics). The resulting library of amplified sequences is characterized by BLAST searching using identification algorithms. Confirmation in this case was obtained using microarray and PCR analyses. The sequencing techniques have been available for some time, and have proven useful for identification of viruses in an academic setting, though they have not been applied to safety testing of biopharmaceuticals until fairly recently due to the relatively high costs associated with the analyses.

The finding of viral DNA should not be equated with detecting the infectious virus in the product. The sequence-independent amplification, microarray, and virus-specific PCR assays used can detect viral nucleic acid, but as normally performed do not indicate whether infectious virus is present. Generally, with the possible exception of transforming viruses, it is the infectious virus that is of concern, not its DNA. Efforts to assess the presence of intact viral genomic material and of infectious porcine circovirus in this vaccine are most likely underway at this time.

The presence of the PCV viral sequences has provisionally been attributed to the use of porcine trypsin during the culture of the Vero cell substrate in which the vaccine is manufactured. The trypsin used had been gamma-irradiated to inactivate adventitious viruses prior to use. While it would be comforting to believe that the PCV DNA may simply have reflected carryover of non-infectious, lethally-irradiated PCV1 from the trypsin, the fact is that gamma-irradiation is not very effective at inactivating this small, non-enveloped virus (Plavsic and Bolin. Resistence of porcine circovirus to gamma irradiation. Biopharm Int. 14:32-36, 2001). In the case of porcine circovirus, there is little evidence to indicate that the virus is infectious or pathogenic for humans. So regardless of the outcome of the various ongoing studies, it is likely that the use of the GSK rotavirus vaccine will be re-instated after the FDA convenes and discusses the implications of this finding.

I predict that there will be more and more of this kind of revelation in the future as the sequencing techniques display stretches of viral or other contaminant DNA within samples of biopharmaceuticals. I would hate to see revelations like this impede the use of the sequencing technologies going forward, as these technologies are going to be very useful to the industry as rapid detection methods for contaminant identification.

Eliminating those Pesky Viruses

By Dr. Ray Nims

As part of mitigating the risk of introducing viral contaminants into a product during manufacturing, biopharma companies must assess the overall risk from a variety of sources (cell substrate, animal-derived raw materials, upstream and downstream processes, etc.) and consider options for reducing such risk. For global submissions, this requirement is formalized within EP 5.1.7 Viral Safety. For domestic submissions, such risk assessment and mitigation is consistent with the philosophy of the US FDA as formalized within the 1993 Points to Consider in the Characterization of Cell Lines Used to Produce Biologicals; and ICH Q5A (R1) Viral Safety Evaluation of Biotechnology Products Derived From Cell Lines of Human or Animal Origin. 

A photomicrograph of the HIV virus from the CDC

The following options are available for reducing the risk of introducing a virus during manufacture of a biological product:

• Selection of a cell substrate with low inherent viral risk, and adequate characterization of the manufacturing cell substrate will reduce the risk associated with this important reagent.

• Elimination of the use of animal-derived raw materials and excipients will greatly reduce the risk of introduction of a virus, but of course this is not always possible.

• Where it is necessary to use an animal-derived material (ADM) in the manufacturing process, the following steps should be taken: (1) evaluate the viral risk associated with the ADM; (2) mitigate the viral risk through sourcing strategies, quality control testing at the source and/or at the biopharma, and implementation, where possible, of viral inactivation treatment (e.g., gamma-irradiation) of the ADM.

• Once an ADM has been incorporated into a reagent such as a culture medium, the reagent itself may be subjected to viral inactivation strategies such as UVC-treatment or high-temperature short-time (HTST) treatment.

• Avoidance of the use of open-vessel operations during upstream processes, as they provide entrance points for viruses.

• Implementation of in-process and lot release viral detection tests to provide early indications of a viral infection in an upstream process.

• Implementation and characterization of robust and efficacious viral purification strategies during downstream processing of the biologic.

It is an expectation of the regulatory agencies that each biopharma will employ a combination of the above options in order to assure the viral safety of their biological products. If a viral contamination event should occur during a manufacturing run, it should be thoroughly investigated, with the aim of identifying the source(s) of the contamination. The information learned during the course of investigation should be used to eliminate the source of the contamination, and mitigate the risk of any future similar recurrences of the contamination.

Is Bovine Polyoma Virus Getting You Down?

By Dr. Ray Nims

Bovine polyomavirus (BPyV) is a double-stranded DNA virus of genus Polyomavirus. It is non-enveloped and 40-50 nm in diameter, and is a member of the same genus as SV40.

Basis of Concern. The Polyomavirus genus was so-named due to the ability of the viruses to cause tumors in susceptible host animals. Genomic sequences for the potentially oncogenic bovine polyomavirus have been detected with high frequency in bovine sera, regardless of geographic region of origin (Shuurman et al., J. Gen. Virol. 72: 2739-2745, 1991; Wang et al., New Zealand Vet. J. 53: 26-30, 2005).

Regulatory Expectations. Bovine polyomavirus is not mentioned specifically in 9CFR 113.47, Detection of extraneous viruses by the fluorescent antibody technique, as a virus of concern for raw materials of bovine origin. As a result, BPyV is not specifically probed for during most 9CFR 113.53-based raw material viral infectivity testing, and this test most likely would not be capable of detecting BPyV if present in the test material. The EMEA Note for Guidance on the use of Bovine Serum in the Manufacture of Human Biological Medicinal Products (CPMP/BWP/1793/02) states that sera users are “encouraged to apply infectivity assays for BPyV and to investigate methods for inactivation/removal of BPyV in order to limit or eliminate infectious virus from batches of serum”.

Mitigating Risk. In actual practice, the available infectivity assays for BPyV involve numerous passages using a bovine detector cell such as MDBK and are somewhat lengthy and insensitive, though more sensitive assays are under development. Cell-based infectivity testing for BPyV is not always being performed by users for each batch of bovine serum. The lack of a rapid and sensitive infectivity assay also means that viral inactivation studies for BPyV are not practically possible. While another polyomavirus such as SV40 could be used in viral inactivation/removal studies as a proxy for BPyV, in actual practice the murine parvovirus MMV (mouse minute virus) is more typically used as a worst-case model virus for such studies since it is non-enveloped and even smaller than BPyV. The few studies performed with SV40 indicate that gamma-irradiation at the dosages normally employed is not effective at inactivating this virus, as might be expected for a virus of this relatively small size (e.g., Gauvin, 2009). On the other hand, it has been shown (Wang et al., Vox Sanguinis 86: 230-238, 2004) that UVC treatment is effective in inactivating SV40. Note: since originally authoring this blog, I have come across a great number of UV-inactivation papers which indicate that polyomaviruses, and SV-40 in particular, appear to be relatively resistant to UV inactivation. The Wang et al. result may represent an outlier. I will address this in a future blog. Studies using MMV indicate that high-temperature short-time (HTST)-treatment of medium containing bovine serum is effective in inactivating this virus (Schleh et al., Biotechnol. Prog. 25: 854-860, 2009), and would by implication be effective for BPyV.

Conclusions. At the present time, infectivity screening of bovine sera for BPyV is not always being performed, and it is believed that the high frequency of detection of genomic material in bovine sera may not reflect a similarly high frequency of infectious BPyV. Risk of infection of biological products with BPyV through use of bovine-derived materials such as bovine sera may be mitigated through implementation of UVC- or HTST-treatment of media containing the sera and of viral purification processes capable of removing and inactivating an even smaller non-enveloped virus such as MMV.

Can Cache Valley Virus Trash Your Manufacturing?

By Dr. Ray Nims

Cache Valley virus is a single-stranded RNA virus of family bunyavirus, genus Bunyavirus. It is enveloped and nominally 80-120 nm in diameter. Cache Valley virus was first isolated in Utah in 1956 and is carried by mosquitoes. It has since been found to be a widespread virus, having been isolated in Texas, Michigan, North Carolina, Indiana, Virginia and Maryland, for example.

source: Nims et al., BioPharm. Int. 21: 89-94, 2008

Basis of Concern. Cache Valley virus is known to infect livestock, causing birth defects. There have been two reports of encephalitic disease in humans attributed to Cache Valley virus. This virus has been isolated from biologics manufacturing processes employing Chinese hamster cell substrates on a number of occasions from 2000 to 2004 (Nims et al., BioPharm. Int. 21: 89-94, 2008). The route of entry of the virus into biologics production processes has not been established with certainty, although the use of contaminated bovine serum is considered to be the most likely source. Thus far the virus has only been known to infect manufacturing processes employing bovine serum.

Regulatory Expectations. Cache Valley virus is not mentioned specifically in any regulatory guidance, as the detection of this virus in biologics production has been reported only within the past decade. It is the intent of the guidance, however, that occurrences of viral contamination in biologics manufacturing be dealt with through implementation of specific testing methods as required to assure detection of future recurrences (e.g., ICH Q5A R1). In addition, it is expected that the route of entry of the virus be established and that the process be remediated so that future recurrences are prevented where possible (e.g., 1997 Points to Consider in the Manufacture and Testing of Monoclonal Antibody Products for Human Use).

Mitigating Risk. Although many Contract Testing laboratories offer rapid nucleic acid-based detection assays for Cache Valley virus, raw material screening for this virus using such assays does not appear to be a viable means of eliminating risk. The industry experience thus far indicates that Cache Valley virus may be a low level, non-homogeneous contaminant of bovine serum. Viral screening performed on one bottle out of a large lot of serum therefore is no guarantee that this virus will not be encountered. Elimination of animal-derived materials (esp. bovine serum) from the manufacturing process may help to reduce the risk of experiencing this virus. Should this not be possible, treatment of the serum or serum-containing media should be considered. Gamma-irradiation has been demonstrated to be effective in inactivating this virus in bovine serum (Gauvin, 2009). UVC treatment of media containing bovine serum also appears to be quite effective at inactivating Cache Valley virus (Weaver, 2009).

Conclusions. Cache Valley virus infects livestock and has been found to contaminate biologics manufacturing processes employing bovine serum. It is a virus of concern for biologics manufacturers employing bovine serum which has not been gamma-irradiated. Risk of infection of biological products with Cache Valley virus through use of bovine serum may be mitigated through implementation of gamma-irradiation of the serum, or UVC- or high-temperature short-time (HTST) treatment of media containing the serum and of viral purification processes capable of removing and inactivating enveloped viruses.

Got Animal-Derived Materials? Part 3

By Dr. Ray Nims

The assessment of viral and transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) risk for animal-derived materials (ADM) used in the manufacture of biologics, which we have described in previous blogs, is just one component of an overall ADM program that should be in place at each organization producing biologics.

A formal ADM program at a biologics manufacturer ideally should be driven by an overriding SOP or policy document. This should address the procedures in place for minimizing the use of ADM, for procuring ADM with a view to minimizing viral and TSE risk, and for assessing the viral and TSE risk associated with the ADM that are used. There are specific sourcing requirements for ADM that are intended to minimize TSE risk (EMEA/410/01 Rev. 2 October 2003), and these must be followed or justification provided if deviated from. The evaluation of ADM for the presence of viruses of concern is addressed in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 9 Part 113.53. ADM viral and TSE risk assessments should be conducted according to a formalized procedure by teams of individuals with education, training, and/or experience appropriate for these tasks. The composition of the risk assessment teams and the qualifications of their members should be described in revisable controlled documents. The risk assessments themselves should be recorded in controlled documents which may revised as new information becomes available from the ADM suppliers. The ADM information that is used as part of the risk assessment process should be archived in a manner tying it to the risk assessment itself.

The existence of a formalized ADM program, qualified risk assessment teams, as well as reports documenting the individual ADM risk assessments may be the subject of regulatory scrutiny during periodic inspections or inspections tied to a new product application. This is especially likely if the product is intended for global distribution, as these ADM issues are specifically mentioned in EP (Chapter 5.1.7) and EMEA (EMEA/410/01 Rev. 2 October 2003) guidance.

Should we care about…Vesiviruses?

By Ray Nims

Vesiviruses are single-stranded RNA viruses of family calicivirus, genus Vesivirus. They are non-enveloped and 30-40 nm in diameter, and the genus includes feline calicivirus, vesicular exanthema of swine virus, rabbit vesivirus, and San Miguel sea lion virus, as well as vesivirus isolate 2117.

source: Stewart McNulty, Queens University, Belfast, UK

Basis of Concern. Vesivirus 2117 has been isolated from biologics manufacturing processes employing Chinese hamster cell substrates on a number of occasions, the first being reported in 2003 (Oehmig et al., J. Gen. Virol. 84, 2837-2845, 2003), and additional occurrences being reported in 2008 and 2009.
The susceptibility of relevant manufacturing cell lines of different animal species to infection by this virus appears to be limited to the Chinese hamster. When infected, these cells undergo a relatively rapid lytic infection. The route of entry of the virus into biologics production processes has not been established with certainty, although the use of contaminated animal-derived materials, such as bovine sera, is considered to be the most likely source.

Regulatory Expectations. Vesivirus is not mentioned specifically in any regulatory guidance, as the detection of the 2117 isolate in biologics production has been reported only within the past decade. It is the intent of the guidance, however, that occurrences of viral contamination in biologics manufacturing be dealt with through implementation of specific testing methods as required to assure detection of future recurrences (e.g., ICH Q5A R1). In addition, it is expected that the route of entry of the virus be established and that the process be remediated so that future recurrences are prevented where possible (e.g., 1997 Points to Consider in the Manufacture and Testing of Monoclonal Antibody Products for Human Use).

Mitigating Risk. At least three Contract Testing laboratories have announced rapid nucleic acid-based detection assays for vesivirus isolate 2117 within the past year. These assays are available for raw material screening and for in-process testing of biologics bulk harvest samples. Elimination of animal-derived materials (esp. bovine sera) from the manufacturing process may help to reduce the risk of experiencing this virus. Should this not be possible, treatment of the sera or sera-containing media should be considered. Studies on the inactivation of caliciviruses indicate that UV treatment may be effective (Duizer et al., Appl. Env. Microbiol. 70, 4538-4543, 2004; de Roda Husman et al., Appl. Env. Microbiol. 70, 50989-5093, 2004). Gamma-irradiation at the dosages normally used does not appear to be effective, as might be expected for a virus of this relatively small size. Studies using MMV indicate that high-temperature short-time (HTST)-treatment of medium containing bovine serum is effective in inactivating this virus (Schleh et al., Biotechnol. Prog. 25: 854-860, 2009), and would by implication be effective for vesiviruses in general.

Conclusions. Vesivirus isolate 2117 preferentially infects Chinese hamster cells and has been found to contaminate biologics manufacturing processes employing this cell substrate. It is now a virus of concern for the biopharmaceutical industry. Risk of infection of biological products with vesiviruses through use of bovine-derived materials such as bovine sera may be mitigated through implementation of UV or HTST treatment of media containing the sera and of viral purification processes capable of removing and inactivating an even smaller non-enveloped virus such as MMV.