Assessing rapid viral enumeration/detection systems

By Dr. Ray Nims

In a previous posting, we alluded to the recent availability of rapid methods for identification of viruses. These technologies, together with rapid methods for enumerating viruses, should greatly expedite the quantification and identification of viruses (and bacteriophage) as compared with the existing cell culture-based approaches.

Rapid enumeration technologies are intended to replace the cell-based infectivity endpoints such as plaque assays or tissue-culture infectious dose assays, which typically require 7-10 days for completion. The use of the rapid methods may be appropriate in cases where it is not necessary to determine the infectious titer of a virus stock. An example of this might be for monitoring the amplification of viruses for preparation of live or subunit vaccines. The particle enumeration technologies include those that specifically measure viral particles and those that measure particles in general. As shown in Table 1, the particle enumeration technologies are not specific to any given virus. These are not generally useful, therefore, for viral identification, although the particle detection method associated with the NanoSight system does allow for sizing of the particles. Viral particle size is a key attribute to be aware of when, for instance, attempting to identify an unknown viral contaminant.

Table 1. Characteristics of rapid viral enumeration/identification technologies

The quantitative polymerase chain reaction (Q-PCR) and universal biosensor (Ibis T5000) technologies represent approaches that are capable of providing information both on the relative quantity of a virus in a sample and its identity. The important difference between the two is that in the former case (Q-PCR), the user is typically evaluating the identity and or quantity of a virus which is reactive with the specific primers and probes used in the assay. From an identification standpoint then, the Q-PCR technique has typically been used to confirm whether an unknown virus is related to the virus for which the assay primers and probes was designed. The degree of relatedness required is determined by the specific primers and probes used in the assay, and may be either to the genus level or the species level. Efforts are being made to incorporate primers for more highly conserved sequences to allow for more broad coverage in Q-PCR assays intended for viral screening. In the case of the universal biosensor (Ibis T5000), an unknown virus in a sample may be simultaneously identified and quantified, as long as the virus is or is closely related to one for which mass spectrometry information is present in the software used for assay analysis. Quantification in either case is in genomic units, and as with the particle enumeration methods, the readout of the quantitative nucleic acid methods does not indicate whether the virus detected is infectious. An additional nucleic acid-based method that may prove useful, in cases where relatively rapid identification of an unknown viral contaminant is needed, is deep (massively parallel) sequencing. This method is more labor intensive (and perhaps costly) then the other quantitative nucleic acid methods described above, but has the advantage that it can provide information regarding the completeness (partial vs. full-length) of the viral genomic sequences detected. This approach has displayed utility in identifying a novel picornavirus in harbor seal samples, porcine circovirus in rotavirus vaccines, and a new parvovirus in bovine serum.

Microarray screening is a technology that may be used to rapidly identify (but not enumerate) an unknown virus in a sample, provided that a probe for the virus is part of the microarray chip. Some microarray chips intended for viral identification also contain probes for conserved viral genomic sequences. In this case, the microarray may identify a novel unknown virus, at least to the genus level. As with the other rapid methods that are based on presence of specific genomic material, the assay cannot discriminate between infectious and non-infectious virus.

See Table 1 for some of the important characteristics and limitations of each method. The use of the rapid methods discussed above and in Table 1 should reduce the time needed for viral quantitation from weeks to hours, and for identification of an unknown contaminant in a sample from months (or years) to one or more days. This should greatly facilitate the monitoring of viral proliferation in manufacturing processes and the investigation of viral contamination events.

Rapid Identification of Viral Contaminants, Finally

By Ray Nims, Ph.D.


There was a time, not long ago, when it might take months to years to identify a viral contaminant isolated from a biological production process or from an animal or patient tissue sample. The identification process took this long because it involved what I have referred to as the “shotgun approach”, or it involved luck.

Let’s start with luck. That is probably the wrong term. What I mean by this is that there have been instances where an informed guess has led to a fairly rapid (i.e., weeks to months) identification of a contaminant. For instance, our group at BioReliance was able to rapidly identify contamination with REO virus (REO type 2 actually) and Cache Valley virus  because we had observed these viruses in culture previously and because these viruses had unique properties (a unique cytopathic effect in the case of REO and a unique growth pattern in the case of Cache Valley virus). The time required to identify these viruses consisted of the time required to submit and obtain results from confirmatory PCR testing for the specific agents.

The first time we ran into Cache Valley virus, however, it was a different story. This was, it turns out, the first time that this particular virus had been detected in a biopharmaceutical bulk harvest sample. In this case, we participated in the “shotgun approach” that was applied to the identification of the isolate. The “shotgun approach” consisted of utilizing any detection technique available at the lab, namely, in vitro screening, bovine screening, application of any immunofluorescent stains available, and transmission electron microscopy (TEM). The TEM was helpful, as it indicated a 80-100 nm virus with 7-9 nm spikes. A bunyavirus-specific stain showed positive, and eventually (after months of work), sequencing and BLAST alignment was used to confirm the identity of the virus as Cache Valley virus.

The “shotgun approach” was subsequently applied to a virus isolated from harbor seal tissues, with no identity established as a result. After approximately a year of floundering using the old methods, the virus was eventually found to be a new picornavirus (Seal Picornavirus 1).  How was this accomplished? During the time between the identification of the Cache Valley virus and the seal virus, a new technology called deep sequencing became available. Eric Delwart’s group used the technique to rapidly identify the virus to the species level. As this was the first time this particular picornavirus had ever been detected, deep sequencing is likely the only method that would have been able to make the identification.

Deep (massively parallel) sequencing is one of a few new technologies that will make virus isolate identification routine and rapid in the future. It has been adopted for detection of viral contaminants in cells and viral seed stocks and for evaluating vaccine cell substrates by BioReliance.The other is referred to as the T5000 universal biosensor. Houman Dehghani’s group at Amgen has been characterizing this methodology as a rapid identification platform for adventitious agent contaminations.  Each technology has its advantages. Deep sequencing is more labor intensive, but has the ability to indicate (as described above) a new species. The universal biosensor can both serve as a detection method and as an identification method. Both can identify multiple contaminants within a sample.

Since identification of an adventitious viral contaminant of a biopharmaceutical manufacturing process is required for establishment of root cause, for evaluating effectiveness of facility cleaning procedures and viral purification procedures, and for assuring safety of both workers and patients, it is critical that the identification of a viral isolate is completed accurately and rapidly. Happily, we now have the tools at hand to accomplish this.

Eliminating those Pesky Viruses

By Dr. Ray Nims

As part of mitigating the risk of introducing viral contaminants into a product during manufacturing, biopharma companies must assess the overall risk from a variety of sources (cell substrate, animal-derived raw materials, upstream and downstream processes, etc.) and consider options for reducing such risk. For global submissions, this requirement is formalized within EP 5.1.7 Viral Safety. For domestic submissions, such risk assessment and mitigation is consistent with the philosophy of the US FDA as formalized within the 1993 Points to Consider in the Characterization of Cell Lines Used to Produce Biologicals; and ICH Q5A (R1) Viral Safety Evaluation of Biotechnology Products Derived From Cell Lines of Human or Animal Origin. 

A photomicrograph of the HIV virus from the CDC

The following options are available for reducing the risk of introducing a virus during manufacture of a biological product:

• Selection of a cell substrate with low inherent viral risk, and adequate characterization of the manufacturing cell substrate will reduce the risk associated with this important reagent.

• Elimination of the use of animal-derived raw materials and excipients will greatly reduce the risk of introduction of a virus, but of course this is not always possible.

• Where it is necessary to use an animal-derived material (ADM) in the manufacturing process, the following steps should be taken: (1) evaluate the viral risk associated with the ADM; (2) mitigate the viral risk through sourcing strategies, quality control testing at the source and/or at the biopharma, and implementation, where possible, of viral inactivation treatment (e.g., gamma-irradiation) of the ADM.

• Once an ADM has been incorporated into a reagent such as a culture medium, the reagent itself may be subjected to viral inactivation strategies such as UVC-treatment or high-temperature short-time (HTST) treatment.

• Avoidance of the use of open-vessel operations during upstream processes, as they provide entrance points for viruses.

• Implementation of in-process and lot release viral detection tests to provide early indications of a viral infection in an upstream process.

• Implementation and characterization of robust and efficacious viral purification strategies during downstream processing of the biologic.

It is an expectation of the regulatory agencies that each biopharma will employ a combination of the above options in order to assure the viral safety of their biological products. If a viral contamination event should occur during a manufacturing run, it should be thoroughly investigated, with the aim of identifying the source(s) of the contamination. The information learned during the course of investigation should be used to eliminate the source of the contamination, and mitigate the risk of any future similar recurrences of the contamination.