Viral clearance studies …. are they needed for proteins produced using bacterial or yeast fermentation processes?

Dr. Ray Nims

In E. coli or Pichia pastoris-based bioproduction of recombinant proteins, there are no suitable host cells for amplification of viruses that are infectious for humans. Bacteria such as E. coli and yeast such as P. pastoris can only support the growth of certain bacteriophage or yeast viruses, respectively. These types of viruses are not infectious for humans or animals.

The potential for viral infection of a bacterial cell process or a yeast cell process used for production of a recombinant protein is therefore a business risk, not a patient safety risk. This is the reason why case studies of bacteriophage infection of bacterial fermentation processes or of viral contamination of yeast cell processes have not appeared in the literature (or in the news). Unlike virus contamination of animal cell-based production processes, the events involving bacterial or yeast do not have patient safety implications. When a bacteriophage or yeast virus contamination occurs, manufacturers quietly go about the business of restarting the fermentation. Remediation and prevention of future occurrences is driven primarily by business concerns, as opposed to regulatory concerns.

Manufacturers of recombinant proteins produced using bacterial or yeast cell substrates are not required to conduct cell line viral testing (though phage induction studies may be performed as part of bacterial cell line characterization – to mitigate business risk!), nor are they required to conduct lot-by-lot viral testing of bulk harvest samples. Such requirements are mandated for production processes using animal or human cells. As the title of the document “Quality of Biotechnological Products: Viral Safety Evaluation of Biotechnology Products Derived from Cell Lines of Human or Animal Origin” indicates, the ICH Q5A (R1) guidance mandating such testing is clearly directed toward manufacturing processes utilizing the types of cells which may support growth of viruses infectious for human or animal cells. This ICH document also provides guidance on the conduct of viral clearance studies.

Viral clearance studies are intended to provide evidence of the ability of downstream purification steps of a manufacturing process to remove or inactivate viruses that potentially may contaminate the process, make their way into final product, and represent a health risk to patients. As such, the evaluation typically involves both relevant viruses (i.e., viruses that are known to contaminate these kinds of processes) and model viruses (i.e., viruses representative of the types of viruses that could contaminate these processes). In the case of bacteria- and yeast-based manufacturing processes, the relevant viruses (bacteriophage and yeast viruses, respectively) are not infectious for humans or animals. In addition, there are no model viruses that are capable of infecting these kinds of cells that are of concern for humans or animals. Therefore, viral clearance studies are typically not required or conducted.

Are there any circumstances where a bacterial or yeast fermentation process could be expected to harbor a virus capable of infecting humans? The only that I can imagine is a process utilizing primary or secondary animal-derived raw materials in rather large quantities. The worry would not be that viral amplification might occur, but that some carryover of surviving animal viruses to the final product might be possible. The use of such animal-derived materials by a manufacturer of a therapeutic protein must be justified based on risk analysis. If substantial risk is introduced by the use of such raw materials, then perhaps a raw material treatment approach would need to be validated.

In the absence of the use of animal derived materials or plant materials not subject to processing steps that would inactivate contaminating animal viruses, incorporation and validation of viral clearance steps into protein production processes using bacteria or yeast cell substrates is not expected, nor would this be of practical value in assuring patient safety.

The inactivation literature for circoviruses

by Dr. Ray Nims

The Circoviridae family of viruses represent an extreme case for small, non-enveloped viruses. We have posted previously that the latter group constitutes a high risk for manufacturers of biologicals due to the difficulty of eradicating the viruses from raw materials or from a contaminated facility.  At 17-25 nm particle size, the circoviruses are among the smallest of the animal viruses. These viruses represent more of an economic threat than a threat to human health. The porcine circoviruses (PCV-1 and PCV-2) and the chicken anemia virus are well known examples of the circoviruses and these have been studied extensively due to their impact on the swine and poultry industries. So why care about the circoviruses in the biologics industry?

We begin being concerned about porcine circoviruses in the context of xenotransplantation of porcine tissues (e.g., islet cells) into humans. The worry was that a porcine circovirus might be transmitted to a patient via the porcine donor tissue. More recently, PCV genomic sequences were discovered in rotavirus vaccines manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline and Merck. The presence of the genomic material was attributed to the use of porcine trypsin during the culture of the cell substrates in which the vaccines were manufactured (see previous post).

As a result of the heightened awareness of the contamination threat posed by the porcine circoviruses, infectivity assays for these viruses are now being offered at contract testing organizations (e.g., BioReliance, MICROBIOTEST, and WuXi Apptec), for raw material testing, cleaning efficacy testing, and for evaluating the clearance of the circoviruses by purification processes. As might be expected based on our experience with other small, non-enveloped viruses, inactivation approaches that are effective against many larger non-enveloped  or enveloped viruses have little efficacy for the circoviruses.

So how much do we actually know about the inactivation of  circoviruses? The literature on the subject is fairly extensive for PCV-2 and for chicken anemia virus, if one is willing to spend time digging deeply. I have done the digging, and have assembled the literature into the following categories of inactivants: heat, irradiation, and disinfectants/chemicals. Keep in mind that the inactivation potential of the physical or chemical agents depends greatly upon the matrix in which the virus is present as well as the temperature and contact time with inactivant. The matrices evaluated varied for the studies described below, and the reader is directed to the individual papers for this critical detail. In addition, some variability in results may be expected because of the relative difficulty in assaying infectivity of the circoviruses.

A number of studies on the thermal stability of the circoviruses have been published. In general, it appears that 15 or more minutes of exposure to wet heat (heating of viruses spiked into solutions) at temperatures ≥80 ◦C should provide extensive inactivation (3-5 log₁₀) of circoviruses. Dry heat (heating of freeze-dried virus and, by implication, viruses on the surfaces of coupon materials) appears to be much less effective, resulting in <1.5 log₁₀ inactivation even at temperatures as high as 120 ◦C . The results of at least one investigator suggest that a temperature of 95 ◦C will be sufficient for high temperature short time (HTST) treatment for mitigating the risk of introducing a circovirus in a process solution.

A number of studies on the inactivation of the circoviruses by disinfectants and other chemicals have appeared in the literature, reflecting the relatively great economic threat of the circoviruses to the swine, poultry, and exotic bird industries. While many of the chemicals/disinfectants had little efficacy for inactivation of the circoviruses (as might be expected for a non-enveloped virus), certain treatments appear to have been highly effective. These included the following: a) glutaraldehyde at 1% or 2% and 10 or more minutes contact time; b) sodium hypochlorite at 6% and 10 or more minutes contact time; c) sodium hydroxide  at 0.1 N or greater; d) Roccal® D Plus at 0.5% and 10 minutes contact time; e) Virkon® S at 1% and 10 minutes contact time; f) β-propiolactone at 0.4% and 24 hours contact time; and g) formaldehyde at 10% and 2 hours contact time. Variable results were obtained for the iodine-containing disinfectants. These ranged from <1.0 log₁₀ inactivation for iodine (10%; 30 minutes contact time; 20 ◦C) to ≥5.5 log₁₀ for Cleanap® (1%; 2 hours contact time; 37 ◦C). A third study involving an iodine-containing disinfectant, FAM®30 (Biocide30) used at 1% or 2%; 30 minutes contact time, and 10 ◦C temperature demonstrated ≥3.5 log₁₀ inactivation.

The literature on inactivation of circoviruses by irradiation is scant, to say the least. Plavsic and Bolin showed that gamma irradiation of PCV-2-spiked fetal bovine serum at the radiation doses normally employed for serum treatment (30 and 45 kGy) resulted in ≤1.0 log₁₀ reduction in virus titer. Gamma irradiation (at the doses normally used) appears to be relatively ineffective for inactivating the very smallest of the viruses (parvoviruses and circoviruses) in serum so this result is perhaps not surprising. One approach that offers hope for inactivation of circoviruses is ultraviolet radiation (specifically UV-C) treatment, as this technology appears to be effective for smaller non-enveloped viruses such as the parvoviruses and caliciviruses. I expect that studies to demonstrate efficacy of UV-C for inactivating circoviruses will be performed in the near future.

In summary, there is ample evidence in the literature that effective inactivation approaches exist for the circoviruses. Careful selection of inactivation technologies that is based on the body of evidence accumulated by workers in the swine and poultry industries should enable appropriate risk mitigation and facility cleaning strategies to be adopted in the biologics industry.

<This material was excerpted in part from Nims and Plavsic, Bioprocessing J, 2012; 11:4-10>

Ridding serum of viruses with gamma irradiation: part 2

by Dr. Ray Nims

In a previous posting, we described the susceptibility of viruses from various families to inactivation in frozen serum treated with gamma irradiation (data from the literature). Gamma irradiation is a commonly employed risk mitigation strategy for biopharmaceutical manufacture, and indeed the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products in its Note for guidance on the use of bovine serum states that some form of inactivation (such as gamma irradiation) is expected. The use of non-treated serum in the production of biologics for human use must be justified, due to the potential for introducing a viral contaminant through use of this animal-derived material.

But how effective is this particular risk mitigation strategy? To answer this, we expressed the susceptibility to inactivation by gamma radiation for a series of 16 viruses in terms of log10 reduction in titer per kiloGray (kGy) of gamma radiation. With this value in hand, one may easily calculate the log10 reduction in titer of a given virus which might be expected following irradiation of frozen serum at any given kGy dose (serum is typically irradiated at a dose of 25-40 kGy).

The next step is to try to understand the results obtain with this relatively limited series of viruses, so that we may extrapolate the results to other viruses. If we take a look at the viral characteristics that might confer susceptibility to inactivation by gamma irradiation, will we find what we are looking for?

Viral characteristics that have been postulated to contribute to susceptibility or resistance to inactivation by gamma irradiation include: 1) radiation target size (genome size, particle size, genome shape, segmentation of the genome); 2) strandedness (in double stranded genomes the genomic information is recorded in duplicate, so loss of information on one strand may not be as damaging as it would be in the case of a single stranded genome); 3) presence or absence of a lipid envelope (non-enveloped viruses are resistant to a variety of chemical and physical inactivation approaches); and 4) genome type (RNA vs. DNA). The characteristics for our series of 16 viruses are displayed in the following table (click on table to enlarge).

For evaluating the contribution of radiation target size, we are able to make use of quantitative values available for each virus for genome size (in nucleotides) and particle size (in nm). Plotting genome size vs. log10 reduction in titer per kGy yields the results shown below. The coefficient of determination obtained is just 0.32, suggesting that factors other than (or in addition to!) genome size in nucleotides must be important..

A somewhat better concordance is obtained between particle size and log10 reduction in titer per kGy as shown below. The fit line in this case is non-linear, with a coefficient of determination of 0.60.

The contributions of genome type (RNA vs. DNA), genome strandedness, and lipid envelope (present or absent) to susceptibility to inactivation by gamma irradiation appear to be minimal, within this limited series of viruses. As a result, we are left with the conclusion that the most clear, albeit incomplete, determinant of susceptibility to inactivation by gamma irradiation appears to be particle size. This probably explains the resistance to inactivation displayed by the extremely small viruses such as circoviruses, parvoviruses, and caliciviruses. It is less clear why the polyomaviruses (e.g., SV-40 at 40-50 nm) are so resistant to gamma irradiation while certain of the picornaviruses (25-30 nm) are less resistant to inactivation. More work in this area is needed to better understand all of the factors that contribute to susceptibility to gamma radiation inactivation in viruses and bacteriophage.

< This information was excerpted in part from Nims, et al. Biologicals (2011) >

A much improved Ph. Eur. Chapter 5.3.2

By Dr. Ray Nims

Vaccine manufacturers intending to market in the EU should be aware of a recent change in the European Pharmacopoeia (Ph. Eur.) chapter 5.2.3 Cell substrates for production of vaccines for human use. This chapter addresses the characterization of vaccine cell substrates. The section on Test Methods for Cell Cultures within the chapter includes an instruction to perform a co-cultivation study. The language previously was as follows: “Co-cultivation. Co-cultivate intact and disrupted cells separately with other cell systems including human cells and simian cells. Carry out examinations to detect possible morphological changes. Carry out tests on the cell culture fluids to detect haemagglutinating viruses. The cells comply with the test if no evidence of any extraneous agent is found.”

This section has been changed, as of Ph. Eur. version 7.2 effective in January of 2011, to the following: “Co-cultivation. For mammalian and avian cell lines, co-cultivate intact and/or disrupted cells separately with other cell systems including human cells and simian cells. For insect cell lines, extracts of disrupted cells are incubated with other cell systems, including human, simian, and at least 1 cell line that is different from that used in production, is permissible to insect viruses and allows detection of human arboviruses (for example BHK-21). Carry out examinations to detect possible morphological changes. Carry out tests on the cell culture fluids to detect haemagglutinating viruses, or on cells to detect haemadsorbing viruses. The test for haemagglutinating viruses does not apply for arboviruses to be detected in insect cells. The cells comply with the test if no evidence of any extraneous agent is found.”

So what is the big deal? Co-cultivation is a commonly employed technique for detecting infectious retrovirus in a cell bank. It is effective for this purpose because the chances for spread of infectious virus from test cell to indicator (host) cell are optimized by the cultivation of live cells of each kind in close proximity. The endpoint of the retrovirus assay, be it reverse transcriptase enzyme induction or rescue of an S+L- virus, is not interfered with by the presence of two cell types in one culture. The same is not always true for a co-cultivation of a test cell with an indicator (host) cell for detection of infectious virus when morphological changes (viral cytopathic effects) are one of the assay endpoints. The reason is that the diploid human cells (e.g., MRC-5 or WI-38) used as one of the indicator cells in such assays are rapidly displaced during co-cultivation with intact continuous cell lines used to produce vaccines, such as the simian cell Vero. The result of this is that within a short period of time in co-cultivation, the test culture is no longer predominated by the diploid cell but rather by the test cells and observation of the culture for cytopathic effects becomes problematic. Changing the language of this section to read “…co-cultivate intact and/or disrupted cells separately with other cell systems…” allows the user to eliminate the inoculation of intact test cells onto a diploid indicator cell.

The other useful modification to the language of this section is the following addition: “For insect cell lines, extracts of disrupted cells are incubated with other cell systems, including human, simian, and at least 1 cell line that is different from that used in production, is permissible to insect viruses and allows detection of human arboviruses (for example BHK-21).” Testing of insect cells for extraneous virus is only marginally effective when it is conducted per the usual method of inoculating another insect cell. Why? The insect cells that are available are most commonly suspension cultures, making observation for cytopathic effect problematic. The extraneous viruses that are of most concern for an insect production cell are the arboviruses (viruses transmitted via insect vectors). It has been known for some time that the Syrian hamster cell line BHK-1 is an excellent host cell for detecting arboviruses. The new language in this section of Ph. Eur. chapter 5.2.3 now clears the way for the use of the monolayer BHK-1 cell line to be used for the testing of insect cells for extraneous virus. In this regard the Ph. Eur. chapter is now more closely aligned with the World Health Organization’s 2009 Evaluation of cell substrates for the production of biologicals: revision of WHO recommendations. The latter has the following passage: "For instance, in the case of insect cell substrates, certain insect cell lines may be used for detection of insect viruses, and BHK cells may serve for the detection of arboviruses."

   

Taken together, the recent changes to Ph. Eur. Chapter 5.2.3 greatly improve the chapter and the viral safety testing of vaccine production cell banks specifically proscribed within it.

Ridding serum of viruses with gamma irradiation: part 1

by Dr. Ray Nims

Blood serum, while at times required as a medium component for cell growth in vitro, is an animal-derived material that can introduce contaminating viruses such as Cache Valley virus, REO virus, vesivirus, and epizootic hemorrhagic disease virusinto a biological product. If animal serum must be used in upstream manufacturing processes, the risk of introducing a virus may be mitigated by gamma irradiation of the frozen serum prior to use. How effective is this treatment, and against which viruses?

To answer this question, I have surveyed the literature from the past two decades. A number of investigations have been conducted and the results are in the public domain. The most useful of these studies have examined the dose-response relationships for viral inactivation (rendering of the virus as non-infectious) by gamma irradiation.

In the table below, I have assembled the results obtained for 7 viruses, including four that might be expected to be found in bovine serum: (bovine viral diarrhea virus [BVDV], infectious bovine rhinotracheitis virus [IBR], respiratory-enteric orphan virus [REO virus], and parainfluenza type 3 virus [PI3]). The other three (canine adenovirus, porcine parvovirus [PPV], and mouse minute virus [MMV]), while perhaps not expected to be found in bovine serum, have been studied as model viruses for the adenovirus and parvovirus families (click on table to enlarge).

The efficacy of gamma irradiation for viral inactivation is reported as log10 reduction in titer per kGy, rather than the more commonly employed D10 (Mrad dose required to reduce the titer by 1 log10), as I find the former value to be more useful. To estimate the effectiveness of a given dose of gamma radiation for inactivation of a virus, just multiply the dose in kGy by the log10 reduction in titer per kGy value from the table. The result is the number of logs of inactivation estimated to be achieved for that virus at that radiation dose.

These data tell us that the mid- to large-sized viruses BVDV, IBR, PI3, REO, and CAV should be readily inactivated at the gamma radiation doses normally applied to frozen serum for risk mitigation (25-45 kGy). On the other hand, the two parvoviruses, PPV and MMV, are more difficult to inactivate, presumably due to their small size. Parvoviruses are often used to challenge viral removal and inactivation processes due to their size and lack of an envelope. Higher kGy dose levels may increase the effectiveness of inactivation for these viruses, although at such levels the performance of the animal serum being irradiated may be adversely impacted.

Gamma-irradiation can effectively mitigate the risk of introducing other potential contaminants of bovine serum, including Cache Valley virus, blue tongue virus, and epizootic hemorrhagic disease virus. Like the parvoviruses, however, other relatively small non-enveloped viruses of the calicivirus, picornavirus, polyomavirus, and circovirus families may represent cases where gamma irradiation is less effective at the doses normally applied. Other means of mitigating the risk associated with these viruses may need to be considered.

< This information was excerpted in part from Nims, et al. Biologicals (2011) >


Information sources: Daley et al., FOCUS 20(3):86-88, 1998; Wyatt et al. BioPharm 1993: 6(4):34-40; Purtel et al., 2006; Hanson and Foster, Art to Science 16:1-7, 1997; Hyclone Labs Art to Science 12(2): 1-6, 1993; Gauvin and Nims 2010; Plavsic et al. BioPharm 2001: 14(4):32-36.

Rapid Identification of Viral Contaminants, Finally

By Ray Nims, Ph.D.


There was a time, not long ago, when it might take months to years to identify a viral contaminant isolated from a biological production process or from an animal or patient tissue sample. The identification process took this long because it involved what I have referred to as the “shotgun approach”, or it involved luck.

Let’s start with luck. That is probably the wrong term. What I mean by this is that there have been instances where an informed guess has led to a fairly rapid (i.e., weeks to months) identification of a contaminant. For instance, our group at BioReliance was able to rapidly identify contamination with REO virus (REO type 2 actually) and Cache Valley virus  because we had observed these viruses in culture previously and because these viruses had unique properties (a unique cytopathic effect in the case of REO and a unique growth pattern in the case of Cache Valley virus). The time required to identify these viruses consisted of the time required to submit and obtain results from confirmatory PCR testing for the specific agents.

The first time we ran into Cache Valley virus, however, it was a different story. This was, it turns out, the first time that this particular virus had been detected in a biopharmaceutical bulk harvest sample. In this case, we participated in the “shotgun approach” that was applied to the identification of the isolate. The “shotgun approach” consisted of utilizing any detection technique available at the lab, namely, in vitro screening, bovine screening, application of any immunofluorescent stains available, and transmission electron microscopy (TEM). The TEM was helpful, as it indicated a 80-100 nm virus with 7-9 nm spikes. A bunyavirus-specific stain showed positive, and eventually (after months of work), sequencing and BLAST alignment was used to confirm the identity of the virus as Cache Valley virus.

The “shotgun approach” was subsequently applied to a virus isolated from harbor seal tissues, with no identity established as a result. After approximately a year of floundering using the old methods, the virus was eventually found to be a new picornavirus (Seal Picornavirus 1).  How was this accomplished? During the time between the identification of the Cache Valley virus and the seal virus, a new technology called deep sequencing became available. Eric Delwart’s group used the technique to rapidly identify the virus to the species level. As this was the first time this particular picornavirus had ever been detected, deep sequencing is likely the only method that would have been able to make the identification.

Deep (massively parallel) sequencing is one of a few new technologies that will make virus isolate identification routine and rapid in the future. It has been adopted for detection of viral contaminants in cells and viral seed stocks and for evaluating vaccine cell substrates by BioReliance.The other is referred to as the T5000 universal biosensor. Houman Dehghani’s group at Amgen has been characterizing this methodology as a rapid identification platform for adventitious agent contaminations.  Each technology has its advantages. Deep sequencing is more labor intensive, but has the ability to indicate (as described above) a new species. The universal biosensor can both serve as a detection method and as an identification method. Both can identify multiple contaminants within a sample.

Since identification of an adventitious viral contaminant of a biopharmaceutical manufacturing process is required for establishment of root cause, for evaluating effectiveness of facility cleaning procedures and viral purification procedures, and for assuring safety of both workers and patients, it is critical that the identification of a viral isolate is completed accurately and rapidly. Happily, we now have the tools at hand to accomplish this.

Small, non-enveloped viruses: number 1 threat to biologics manufacture

by Dr. Ray Nims

Perhaps surprisingly, few types of viruses have infected biologics manufacture since the 1980s when the first recombinant proteins began to be produced in mammalian cells. While the list of contaminating viruses has included some relatively large enveloped and non-enveloped viruses (Reovirus type 2, epizootic hemorrhagic disease virus, Cache Valley virus, human adenovirus), by far the most problematic contaminants have been the small non-enveloped viruses. Why? For the most part, the contaminations involving the larger viruses have been attributed to the use of non-gamma irradiated bovine serum or to operators conducting open vessel manipulations. Remediating the manufacturing processes to include gamma irradiation of the serum (or elimination of the use of serum altogether), and eliminating wherever possible open vessel operations should mitigate the risk of experiencing these viruses.

Now we come to the small non-enveloped viruses, the real problem. Foremost among these has been murine minute virus (MMV). This 20-25 nm non-enveloped parvovirus has infected biologics manufacturing processes using Chinese hamster cell substrates on at least four occasions, affecting at least three different manufacturers (Genentech, Amgen, and Merrimack). In each case, the source of the contamination has been unclear, making remediation of the processes difficult. Due to the ability of these viruses to survive on surfaces and their resistance to inactivation by detergents and solvents, eliminating the agent from contaminated facilities may require drastic measures such as fumigation with vaporous hydrogen peroxide .

A second problem virus is the 27-40 nm non-enveloped calicivirus, vesivirus 2117. This is the virus that was found to have infected the Genzyme Allston manufacturing facility in 2009. The same virus had appeared already once in the past, at a manufacturing facility in Germany. Both of the infected processes involved Chinese hamster production cells and both involved the use of bovine serum at some point in the manufacturing process. Whether or not the animal-derived material was the actual source of the infection was not proven in either case. Unfortunately, if the source was the bovine serum, gamma irradiation probably would not mitigate the risk, as gamma irradiation is less effective for inactivating the smaller non-enveloped viruses. This is another virus that may be able to survive on facility surfaces. As in the case with MMV, ridding a manufacturing facility of vesivirus may require entire facility fumigation with vaporous hydrogen peroxide, as was done at Genzyme.

Another problem virus is the 17-20 nm porcine circovirus that was found to contaminate a rotavirus vaccine in 2010. This virus was thought to have originated in contaminated porcine trypsin used in the manufacturing process. Wouldn’t this contaminant have shown up in the raw material testing done for the trypsin, or in the extensive cell bank testing required for vaccine production substrates? The answer is no. The circovirus would not have been detected using the 9CFR-based detection methods used for trypsin at this time (and at present). And the required testing for cell banks used to produce vaccines would not have detected this particular virus. To make matters worse, gamma irradiation of the trypsin would not be expected to inactivate this virus. How can we mitigate the risk of this virus going forward? As described in a previous posting, manufacturers may need to apply specific nucleic acid tests for the circovirus as part of the raw material release process for trypsin.

These and other small non-enveloped viruses represent the greatest risk for biologics manufacturing because they are more difficult to inactivate in raw materials, and more difficult to eradicate from the facility once infected, and because the source of the infection is not always clear. There must be analogous small-non-enveloped bacteriophage lurking out there that represent, for the same reasons, special threats to the fermentation industry.

Getting a grip on prophage

by Dr. Ray Nims

In a previous post, we discussed bacteriophage as a risk for the manufacture of biopharmaceuticals by bacterial fermentation. We mentioned briefly that bacteriophage may integrate within the genome of bacterial cells and that this may also represent a problem. Now we will explain why.

Bacteriophage are viruses that infect bacteria, and they have evolved two mutually exclusive strategies for survival. One involves a lytic growth cycle leading to death (lysis) of the host cell and release of progeny phage that may then infect additional host cells (so-called horizontal transmission). The other strategy is called lysogeny and involves integration of phage coding sequences into the host (bacterial) cell genome. The integrated phage is termed a prophage. This strategy for phage survival is referred to as vertical transmission since the phage genomic material is reproduced along with that of the host cell as the latter proliferates. Under certain circumstances, however, the integrated prophage can excise itself from the host cell chromosome in a process referred to as induction. The excised phage then may initiate a lytic infection of the host cell, causing all of the problems discussed in the previous post.

Illustration of a T4 phage infecting E. coli by Jonathan Heras

The relative success (i.e., from the perspective of the phage!) of the lytic vs. lysogenic survival strategies changes with the probability of host cell survival. Lysogeny appears to be a strategy that allows phage to persist during periods of low host cell availability or poor environmental (e.g., nutrient) conditions. Induction of prophage is an adaptation of the phage to host cell damage. This damage usually takes the form of a major stress to the host cell.

If stess can lead to prophage induction, the worry then becomes that some manipulation of a bacterial production cell during biopharmaceutical manufacture could lead to induction and initiation of a lytic phage infection. How can we assess and mitigate the potential for this to occur? There are two approaches: first, we can perform chemical or physical induction studies to determine the likelihood of encountering a prophage in a given production cell; and second, we can engineer the conditions of bacterial growth such that induction of a prophage is discouraged.

Phage induction studies may be performed on the bacterial production cell following initial engineering of the cell or during characterization of the cell bank. The inducing agent most often employed is mitomycin C. Other types of inducing agents (conditions) include carcinogens (such as the N-nitrosamines), hydrogen peroxide, high temperature, starvation, and UV radiation. The cells are treated with the inducing agent or condition, then one of various endpoints is used to detect the initiation of a lytic phage infection. These could include culture assays as well as molecular techniques such as PCR, microarray, or DNA chips.

Suppose you have an E. coli production cell harboring a problematic prophage. What can be done to discourage phage induction? Certain growth procedures have been shown to reduce spontaneous phage induction in E. coli cultures. These include using lower bacterial growth rates, replacement of glucose in growth medium with glycerol, and engineering the production cell through introduction of a plasmid conferring over-expression of the phage cI gene.

In summary, there are approaches that can identify the likelihood of encountering prophage induction from a bacterial production cell. The time to perform this type of testing is during development of the fermentation process (following the engineering of the production cell), or following banking of the production cell. If prophage induction appears to be a problem, bacterial growth procedures can help to reduce the potential. If this is not sufficient, the production cell may need to be re-engineered to produce a phage-resistant mutant.

What's up with USP Chapter 1050?

by Dr. Ray Nims

United States Pharmacopeia (USP) general chapter <1050> Viral Safety Evaluation of Biotechnology Products Derived from Cell Lines of Human or Animal Origin originally appeared in supplement 10 to USP23-NF18 in May 1999 and was at that time essentially a verbatim adoption of the International Conference of Harmonization (ICH) Guideline Q5A (R1) having the same title.

The chapter describes the methods of evaluating the viral safety of biotechnology pharmaceutical products that are manufactured using cell lines of human or animal origin.

In 2006, an ad hoc advisory panel was assembled by the USP and tasked with revision of this chapter. The goals were to update the chapter and, more specifically, to add greater detail in the viral clearance validation section. The hope was that a user following the recommendations set forth in the general chapter would have greater confidence that viral clearance validation data generated would prove acceptable to the regulatory agencies.

The organization of the revised chapter <1050> was not changed. It comprised the following main sections: 1) Introduction; 2)Potential sources of viral contamination; 3) Cell line qualification: testing for viruses; 4) Testing for viruses in unprocessed bulk; 5) Rationale and action plan for viral clearance studies and viruses tests on purified bulk; and 6) Evaluation and characterization of viral clearance procedures. The changes proposed for the initial 5 sections were minor and primarily reflected attempts to update the chapter and to align the chapter more closely with FDA guidance documents. The most extensive changes were to section 6, in keeping with the goals described above.

The revised chapter was published for public comment in Pharmacopeial Forum 36(3) in the fall of 2010. Comments received as a result of the public review apparently suggested that a more extensive update of the chapter was warranted. At any rate, the revised chapter was not made effective during the USP’s 2005-2010 revision cycle. A new ad hoc advisory panel now being assembled as part of USP's 2010-2015 revision cycle will take over the responsibility for moving the revision of this chapter forward.

Remember....bacteriophage are viruses too

by Dr. Ray Nims

Are you using bacterial cells to produce a biologic? Do not make the mistake of thinking that your upstream process is safe from infection by adventitious viruses. True, you are not required to test for the usual viruses of concern using a lot release adventitious virus assay. But bacterial production systems are susceptible to introduction of viruses just as mammalian cell processes are. In this case, the viruses just happen to be referred to as bacteriophage. Other than this, the putative contaminants have the same nasty property exhibited by viruses that can contaminate mammalian cell processes, that is … their small size (24-200 nm) allows them to readily pass through the filters used to “sterilize” process solutions. So media, buffers, induction agents, vitamin mixes, trace metal mixes, etc. that are fed into the fermenter without proper treatment can introduce a bacteriophage. Especially worrisome in this regard are raw materials that are generated through bacterial fermentation (such as amino acids, antibiotics). A fermenter infected with a lytic phage exhibits a clear signal that the bacterial substrate is unhappy. The trick then is to discover where the phage originated and to mitigate the risk of experiencing it again.

How can you mitigate the risk of experiencing a bacteriophage infection? Many of the same strategies used to protect mammalian cell processes may be applicable to the bacterial fermentation world. Raw materials and/or process solutions may be subjected to gamma-irradiation, to ultraviolet light in the C range, to prolonged heating or to high temperature short time treatment, to viral filtration, etc. In addition, mitigation of risk of bacteriophage contamination may require filtration of incoming gasses using appropriate filters. 

A sampling of the data available on inactivation of bacteriophage by various methods is shown in the table below. The literature is extensive, and as with viral inactivation, the inactivation of phage by certain of the methods (e.g., UVC, gamma-irradiation) may be dependent both upon the matrix in which the phage is suspended as well as the physical properties of the phage (e.g., genome or particle size, strandness, etc.). For fairly dilute aqueous solutions, gamma-irradiation, UVC treatment, or parvovirus filtration should represent effective inactivation/removal methods. HTST at temperatures effective for parvoviruses (102°C, 10 seconds) should be effective for most bacteriophage, although this is an area that needs further exploration.

Mitigating the risk of experiencing a bacteriophage contamination of a bacterial fermentation process is possible if one remembers that bacteriophage are similar to mammalian viruses. Strategies that are effective for small-non-enveloped mammalian viruses (i.e., the worst case for mammalian viruses) should also be effective for most bacteriophage.

A possible exception to this is prophage. In analogy with the presence of endogenous retroviruses in certain mammalian cells (i.e., rodent, human, monkey), there is a possibility of encountering integrated bacteriophage (prophage) in certain bacterial cell lines. Like endogenous retroviruses, prophage may result in the production of infectious particles under certain conditions. This phenomenon deserves some discussion, but this will have to be deferred to a future blog.

References: Purtel et al., 2006; Ward, 1979; Sommer et al., 2001.

Fry those mollicutes!

By Dr. Ray Nims

It is not only viruses that may be introduced into biologics manufactured in mammalian cells using bovine sera in upstream cell growth processes. The other real concern is the introduction of mollicutes (mycoplasmas and acholeplasmas). Mollicutes, like viruses, are able to pass through the filters (including 0.2 micron pore size) used to sterilize process solutions. Because of this, filter sterilization will not assure mitigation of the risk of introducing a mollicute through use of contaminated bovine or other animal sera in upstream manufacturing processes.

Does mycoplasma contamination of biologics occur as a result of use of contaminated sera? The answer is yes. Most episodes are not reported to the public domain, but occasionally we hear of such occurrences. Dehghani and coworkers reported the occurrence of a contamination with M. mycoides mycoides bovine group 7 that was proven to have originated in the specific bovine serum used in the upstream process (Case studies of mycoplasma contamination in CHO cell cultures. Proceedings from the PDA Workshop on Mycoplasma Contamination by Plant Peptones. Pharmaceutical Drug Association, Bethesda, MD. 2007, pp. 53-59). Contamination with M. arginini and Acholeplasma laidlawii attributed to use of specific contaminated lots of bovine serum have also occurred.

Fortunately, the risk of introducing an adventitious mollicute into a biologics manufacturing process utilizing a mammalian cell substrate may be mitigated by gamma-irradiating the animal serum prior to use. This may be done in the original containers while the serum is frozen. Unlike the case for viruses, in which the efficacy of irradiation for inactivation may depend upon the size of the virus, mollicute inactivation by gamma irradatiion has been found to be highly effective (essentially complete), regardless of the species of molicute. The radiation doses required for inactivation are relatively low compared to those required for viruses (e.g., 10 kGy or less, compared to 25-45 kGy for viruses). The gamma irradiation that is performed by serum vendors is typically in the range of 25-40 kGy. This level of radiation is more than adequate to assure complete inactivation of any mollicutes that may be present in the serum. For instance, irradiation of calf serum at 26-34 kGy resulted in ≥6 log10 inactivation of M. orale, M. pneumoniae, and M. hyorhinis. In the table below I have assembled the data available on inactivation of mollicutes in frozen serum by gamma-irradiation.

So, the good news is that gamma irradiation of animal serum that is performed to mitigate the risk of introducing a viral contaminant will also mitigate the risk of introducing a mollicute contaminant. If the upstream manufacturing process cannot be engineered to avoid use of animal serum, the next best option is to validate the use of gamma irradiated serum in the process.  In fact, the EMEA Note for guidance on the use of bovine serum in the manufacture of human biological medicinal products strongly recommends the inactivation of serum using a validated and efficacious treatment, and states that the use of non-inactivated serum must be justified.


References: Gauvin and Nims, 2010; Wyatt et al. BioPharm 1993;6(4):34-40; Purtle et al., 2006

FDA to viral vaccine makers: it's time to update viral testing methods

By Dr. Ray Nims

If you have been following the recent (2010) unfolding of the discovery of porcine circovirus DNA contamination in rotavirus vaccines from GSK and Merck, you may not be surprised to hear that the FDA has asked viral vaccine manufacturers to outline, by October, their plans to update their testing methodologies to prevent future revelations of this type.
 
I had predicted earlier that biologics manufacturers would be asked to provide evidence, going forward, that their porcine raw materials (trypsin being the most common) are free of porcine circovirus. This testing has not been manditory in the past, but adding this to the porcine raw material virus screening battery moving forward is a prudent action in light of the recent rotavirus vaccine experience.

The FDA has appropriately gone a little farther in it's request to the viral vaccine manufacturers. The regulators would like to assure that the future will not bring additional discoveries of viral contaminants in licensed vaccines, and the best way to accomplish this at the moment appears to be to request implementation of updated viral screening methodologies. Does this mean that viral vaccine makers will need to employ deep sequencing on a lot-by-lot basis? Most likely not. It appears that reliance on the in vivo and in vitro virus screening methods which have been the gold standards since the 1980s will, however, no longer be sufficient. So what does this leave us with? What FDA appears to be asking for is a relatively sensitive universal viral screening method.

The in vivo and in vitro methods were, until now, the best option for this purpose. These methods detect infectious virus only and depend upon the ability of the virus to cause an endpoint response in the system (cytopathic effect, hemagglutination, hemadsorption, or pathology in the laboratory animal species used). So viral genomic material would not be detected, and the methods have had to be supplemented with specific nucleic acid-based tests for viruses which could not otherwise be detected (e.g., HIV, hepatitis B, human parvovirus B9, porcine circovirus).

Some options for sensitive and universal viral screening methods which might fit the requirements include DNA microarrays and universal sequencing methods performed on cell and viral stocks. The latter technology may be preferable, as microarrays are constructed to detect known viruses, while the desire is that the technology be universal in the sense that it detect both known and unknown viruses. Such a test will provide additional assurance that the virus and cell banks used to manufacture viral vaccines do not harbor a viral contaminant.

Other universal viral screening methods which are less labor intensive than the sequencing technologies may be developed in the near future and addition of one of these to the release testing battery for viral vaccine lots may need to be considered in satisfying the FDA's goals.

Is Clarence calculating clearance correctly?

by Dr. Ray Nims

As pointed out by Dr. Rudge in a recent posting “Do we have clearance, Clarence?”, spiking studies conducted for the purpose of validating impurity clearance are often done at only one spiking level (indeed often at the highest possible impurity load attainable). This is especially true for validation of adventitious agent (virus and mycoplasma) clearance in downstream processes. The studies are done in this way in order to determine the upper limit of agent clearance (in terms of log10 reduction) by the process. Such log10 reduction factors from individual process steps are then summed in order to determine the overall capability of the downstream processes to clear adventitious agents. The regulatory agencies have fairly clear expectations around such clearance capabilities which must generally be met by biologics manufacturers.

The limiting factor in such clearance studies is typically the amount or titer of the agent that is able to be spiked into the process solution, which is determined by: 1) the titer of the stock used for spiking, and 2) the maximum dilution of the process solution allowed during spiking (typically 10%). Under these circumstances, as Scott points out, there is a possibility that the determined clearance efficiency (i.e., the percentage of the load which is cleared during the step) is an underestimate of the actual clearance that might be obtained at lower impurity loading levels.

Adventitious agent clearance is comprised of two possible modalities, removal and inactivation. Removal refers to physical processes designed to eliminate the agent from the process solution, usually through filtration or chromatography. Removal efficiency through filtration would not be expected to display variability based on impurity loading. On the other hand, chromatographic separation of agents (by, for example, ion-exchange columns) may display saturation at the highest loadings, and therefore use of the highest possible loading levels may result in underestimates of removal efficiency at lower (i.e., more typical) impurity levels.

Inactivation refers to physical or chemical means of rendering the agent non-infectious. Agent inactivation is not always a simple, first-order reaction. It may be more complex, with a fast phase 1 stage of inactivation followed by a slow phase 2 stage of inactivation. An inactivation study is planned in such a way that samples are taken at different times so that an inactivation time curve can be constructed. As with removal studies, the highest possible impurity levels are typically used to determine inactivation kinetics.

Source: Omar et al. Transfusion 36:866-872, 1996

While the information obtained through clearance studies of this type may be incomplete from the point of view of understanding the relationships between impurity loading levels and clearance efficiency, the results obtained are consistent with the regulatory expectation that the clearance modalities be evaluated under worst-case conditions. Therefore, at least in the case of adventitious agent clearance validation, I would say that Clarence is calculating clearance correctly!

The nuts and bolts of retrovirus safety testing

by Dr. Ray Nims


Retroviruses may integrate into the genome of host animals. For this reason they are often referred to as endogenous viruses. Viral particles may or may not be expressed in the host cell. Expressed viruses may be infectious or non-infectious, and infectious virus may have tropism for (ability to infect) the same or different animal species relative to the host cell of origin. Infection results from a process of reverse transcription of the viral RNA leading to proviral DNA. To accomplish this, retroviruses have a specialized enzyme known as reverse transcriptase. Through this process (see figure below), the infected cell may be enlisted to produce viral progeny. Certain of the retroviruses are known to be oncogenic (e.g., human T-lymphotropic virus 1, feline leukemia virus, Raus sarcoma virus, etc.). Other retroviruses are of concern as a result of disease syndromes caused in humans (e.g., human immunodeficiency virus 1 in acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, and the possible role of xenotropic murine leukemia virus-related virus in chronic fatigue syndrome). From a biosafety standpoint, there is a worry that under some conditions, integrated viruses in cell substrates employed to produce biopharmaceuticals which do not normally express their presence may be induced to produce infectious particles.

Source: AccessExcellence

Retrovirology safety testing for biologics manufacture can be confusing to those not familiar with the subject. Here is a brief overview.

Demonstrating retroviral safety typically involves a combination of the following three components:
• detecting infectious retrovirus through cell culture assays (XC plaque, cocultivation with mink lung or Mus dunni cells, etc.).
• measuring reverse transcriptase enzyme activities either through tritiated thymidine incorporation into templates, or through product amplification (PCR) techniques (PERT, etc.). This is not required if infectious retrovirus is detected.
• Visualizing and enumerating retroviral particles in supernatants or in fixed cells using transmission electron microscopy.

The various assays are applied during cell bank characterization (including end of production cell testing), during evaluation and validation of purification processes, and in some instances, as bulk harvest lot-release assays (results from 3 lots at pilot or commercial scale are submitted with the marketing application). For processes using well-characterized rodent cells known to contain endogenous retrovirus (CHO, C127, BHK, murine hybridoma), retroviral infectivity testing of the processed bulk is not required provided that adequate downstream clearance of the particles has been demonstrated.

Infectivity testing can be particularly confusing, due to the variety of cell-based assays employed. These include both direct and indirect assays. An example of a direct assay is the XC-plaque assay for ecotropic (a term meaning the virus is infectious for mouse cells) murine retroviruses. By definition, therefore, this would only be used to assay production cells of mouse origin.

Indirect assays are those in which a second endpoint is required to assess positive or negative outcome. Indirect assays include the various co-cultivation assays in which the test cells are co-cultivated with host cells such as mink lung, Mus dunni, and any of a number of human cells (see Table 4 within USP <1237> Virology Tests for a list of commonly used host cells). The indirect assays are performed to detect xenotropic retroviruses (retroviruses which are capable of infecting only animals other than the species of origin). The secondary endpoints used to assess outcome include reverse transcriptase activity, sarcoma virus rescue (S+L- focus formation assays), or enzyme immunoassay. The indirect assays are used in the retrovirus testing of mouse, hamster, monkey, and human production cell substrates. The selection of the host cell for the cocultivation assay is dependent upon the species of origin of the production cell, recognizing that cocultivation host cells from a species other than that of the production cells must be used. For production processes using rodent or other non-human cells, one or more human host cells are typically used for the cocultivation assay, as xenotropic retroviruses infectious for human cells are of obvious concern.

Still confused? Don’t worry. An individual with virology testing expertise can assist in designing the appropriate retrovirus testing battery for your biologic.

Assessing rapid microbial detection systems

by Dr. Ray Nims

With each passing year, it seems that there are more options available for rapid microbial detection. These rapid systems come in a variety of “flavors”, that is - they differ with respect to a set of key attributes. For instance, how rapid is rapid? What is the sensitivity? What is the maximum sample volume that may be tested? Is it quantitative or qualitative? What units are the results given in? Is it destructive or non-destructive (i.e., can the organism, once detected, be identified)? When one considers the variety of applications for which rapid methods may potentially replace existing culture methods, it rapidly becomes clear that there may not be “one shoe that fits all”.

In order to select an appropriate rapid method for use in one of the many microbial detection applications, one must first assess the available rapid systems for the key attributes mentioned above. This then provides the opportunity to rule out systems which for one reason or the other will not suit the application. There may be some applications for which no rapid system currently meets all requirements. Those rapid systems which do appear to possess the attributes required may be further evaluated for cost and for performance capabilities using specific sample matrices.

In the table below, we have listed some of the currently available rapid microbial detection systems. These include only systems which are 48 hours in duration or less, and therefore some of the sterility replacement assays involving reduced incubation durations (e.g., BacT/ALERT®, Growth Direct™) are not listed.

The key attributes of these rapid systems are displayed in the table below. The systems are arranged by principle of detection, as in the table above. For certain methods (e.g., Micro Pro™) increased sensitivity can be gained through increasing the duration of the incubation time. For non-destructive methods, the ability to identify the organism(s) detected is facilitated by an additional incubation post-detection.

What is the regulatory position on rapid microbial detection methods? The U.S. FDA Guidance for Industry: Sterile Drug Products Produced by Aseptic Processing states that other suitable microbiological tests (e.g., rapid methods) may be considered for environmental monitoring, in-process control testing, and finished product release testing after it has been demonstrated that these new methods are equivalent or better than conventional (e.g., USP) methods. Additionally, the FDA Process Analytical Technology (PAT) initiative encourages the voluntary development and implementation of innovative approaches in pharmaceutical development, manufacturing, and quality assurance (from MJ Miller, PDA Journal 45: 1-5, 2002).

Are rapid methods being used in the pharmaceutical industry? ScanRDI was approved by the FDA for water testing at GSK and for sterility testing at Alcon; Pallchek has been approved by the FDA for bioburden testing at GSK; and Wyeth received approval for use of Celsis for microbial limits testing.

Like all methods proposed to replace existing “gold standards”, these rapid microbial detection systems must be demonstrated through comparability protocols to be equivalent to or better than the existing methods. The effort required should pay dividends in terms of shortened turnaround times and reduced costs.

Riboflavin plus UVA irradiation: another inactivation approach to consider

by Dr. Ray Nims

Short-wavelength ultraviolet irradiation (UVC) has been used for years to disinfect air, surfaces, and thin liquid films because it is effective in inactivating a variety of bacteria, protozoa, phage, and viruses. More recently, UVC (100-280 nm) irradiation has been shown to be useful for viral risk mitigation in biologics manufacturing. UVC-treatment of culture media and other liquid reagents has been demonstrated to inactivate potential adventitious viral contaminants, including those which are resistant to inactivation by other physical means (e.g., murine minute virus; calicivirus; and porcine parvovirus and SV-40 [Wang et al., Vox Sanguinis 86: 230-238, 2004]).

Another approach that has been used recently, especially in the ophthalmologic and blood products communities, is UVA (315-400 nm) in the presence of the photosensitizer riboflavin. Riboflavin interacts with nucleic acid and photosensitizes to damage by UVA leading to direct electron transfer, production of singlet oxygen, and generation of hydrogen peroxide. The treatment results in oxidation and ring-opening of purines and in DNA strand breakage. The advantage of riboflavin over other photosensitizers (e.g., methylene blue, psoralens, etc.) is that riboflavin (vitamin B2) is an endogenous physiological substrate.

 

The photosensitizer interacts with nucleic acids.

Upon irradiation, the results may include cross-linking, mutation, or strand breakage.
Source: Bryant and Klein

Riboflavin/UVA treatment has been explored in ophthalmology applications such as infectious keratitis and keratomycosis. The typical treatment paradigm involves application of a solution of 0.1% riboflavin (as riboflavin-5-phosphate) followed by irradiation using 365 nm light (5 to 10 J/ml). The approach has shown effectiveness against a variety of pathogenic bacteria, including drug-resistant strains. Effectiveness against fungal pathogens requires combination therapy with amphotericin B.

In the blood products community, photosensitizer/UV treatment is being explored for pathogen reduction. For instance, riboflavin/UV treatment is being evaluated for platelet and plasma pathogen reduction, for prevention of graft versus host reactions, and for pathogen reduction in whole blood products. In the proprietary application (Mirasol PRT®), blood product pools are combined with riboflavin (final concentration 50 µM) and the solutions are irradiated with 6.24 J/ml broadband (265-370 nm) UV light. The technology has been shown to be effective for a variety of pathogenic bacteria and viruses (see Table 3 in the review by Bryant and Klein).

Will this approach be useful in the biopharma industry? It appears so. Recently, irradiation with UVA (365 nm) light in the presence of 50 µM riboflavin has been evaluated for controlled inactivation of gene transfer (adenovirus, adeno-associated virus, lentivirus) virus preparations. Complete inactivation was obtained in each case within 90 minutes.

Using porcine trypsin in biologics manufacture?

by Dr. Ray Nims

On March 22, 2010, a press release from GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) announced that porcine circovirus 1 (PCV 1) DNA had been detected in their rotavirus vaccine. On May 6, Merck disclosed that it had found DNA fragments of both PCV types 1 and 2 in its rotavirus vaccine. The PCV 2 findings in Merck's vaccine may be of greater concern, due to the fact that this virus causes disease in pigs, while PCV 1 apparently does not. However, the relative amounts of PCV DNA found in the GSK vaccine appear to be much greater (the lab discovering the PCV DNA in the GSK vaccine did not detect any in the Merck vaccine), and the worry in this case is that some of the genomic material may be associated with infectious PCV 1 virus. In both cases, the presence of the PCV genomic material has been attributed to the use of porcine trypsin at some point in the vaccine manufacturing process.


The FDA convened an advisory committee meeting on May 7th to discuss the findings of PCV DNA in the two licensed rotavirus vaccines. What was the result of the advisory committee meeting? The advisory committee felt that the benefits of the rotavirus vaccines clearly outweigh the risks. This, added to the fact that there appears to be little human health hazard associated with these viruses, led to the FDA clearing the two vaccines for continued use on May 14th. The product labels will be updated to reflect the presence of the PCV DNA in these products. In the longer term, these products may need to be "reengineered" to remove the PCV DNA. This may involve the preparation of new Master and Working cell banks and thus will take some time.

Another likely outcome of the advisory committee’s meeting may be heightened expectations, going forward, for PCV screening of porcine raw materials and of Master and Working cell banks which were exposed to porcine ingredients (e.g., trypsin) at some point in their development. Porcine-derived raw materials which are used in the production of biologics are to be tested per 9 CFR 113.53 Requirements for ingredients of animal origin used for production of biologics for a variety of viruses of concern. In the case of ingredients of porcine origin, those viruses of concern are listed in 9 CFR 113.47 Detection of extraneous viruses by the fluorescent antibody technique. These include rabies, bovine viral diarrhea virus, REO virus, porcine adenovirus, porcine parvovirus, transmissible gastroenteritis virus, and porcine hemagglutinating encephalitis virus. While porcine circovirus may not be specifically mentioned in the 9 CFR requirements, it will be prudent to add a nucleic acid-based assay for detection of this virus to the porcine raw material testing battery going forward. Similarly, Master and Working cell banks exposed to porcine raw materials (e.g., trypsin) during their developmental history should be assayed for PCV prior to use.

Routine nucleic acid-based testing for PCV should detect the genomic sequences for this virus should intact infectious or non-infectious PCV be present in the test materials. Now that this virus is one of concern to the FDA and to the public, performing the appropriate raw material and cell bank testing for it will most likely become an expectation for vaccine and biologics manufacturers.