Update: New USP General Chapter 1050.1

By Dr. Ray Nims

There is a new general chapter being prepared for inclusion in the United States Pharmacopeia (USP). It will be entitled “Design, Evaluation, and Characterization of Viral Clearance Procedures” and will be numbered 1050.1 to associate it with the current General Chapter <1050>.

A little history is called for to make this association more clear. Chapter <1050> first appeared in supplement 10 of USP23-NF-18 in 1999. It was, and still is, a verbatim copy of the International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) document Q5A R1. In fact, it has an identical title: “Viral Safety Evaluation of Biotechnology Products Derived from Cell Lines of Human or Animal Origin”.

In many respects, U5P Chapter <1050> (and ICH Q5A R1) is similar in content and philosophy to the 1993 US FDA Points to Consider (PTC) document entitled "Characterization of Cell Lines used to Produce Biologicals".  Like the 1993 PTC, USP Chapter <1050> expresses an overall safety paradigm composed of three orthogonal approaches. These approaches may be summed up as consisting of testing of raw materials and cell banks, testing of unprocessed bulk harvest, and evaluation of viral clearance steps used during purification. Also like the 1993 PTC, Chapter <1050> describes potential sources of viral contamination, including raw materials and the cell substrate. The scopes of the documents are similar, applying to products derived from cell lines. Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy agents and live or inactivated intact viral vaccines and gene therapy vectors are out of scope and are covered by other guidance documents.

Due to the potential for introducing a viral contaminant through use of an infected cell substrate (e.g., SV40 in polio vaccine, or more recently PCV-1 in rotavirus vaccine), USP Chapter <1050> and the 1993 PTC address the concept of cell banking and the extensive viral testing that is required for cell banks at the Master Bank, Working Bank, and Limit of Cell Growth levels. The second approach of the safety paradigm is the requirement for lot-to-lot testing of the unprocessed bulk harvest. Testing is done at this level as opposed to purified product since purification is designed to eliminate viruses and therefore might preclude the manufacturer from discovering a viral infection. It is the intent of the regulatory agencies that potential opportunities for introduction of a viral contaminant be investigated and remediated, so testing is done prior to purification. The viral testing that is required for unprocessed bulk harvest is a subset of the tests done on the cell banks.

Both USP Chapter <1050> and the 1993 PTC discuss the limitations of viral testing as a sole means to assure viral safety, and this provides a segue for discussion of the need for viral clearance steps and the validation of the ability of such steps to clear viruses from the product. In fact, USP Chapter <1050> does a good job of providing the fundamentals of viral clearance evaluation, however there was a feeling expressed by some in the industry (and especially Mike Rubino, a member of the original ad hoc advisory panel for this chapter) that more detailed guidance on experimental design was needed. This, by the way, is true in general about Chapter <1050> (and IQH Q5A Rl upon which USP <1050> was based) that it is strong on philosophy but weak on specific methodological detail.

The original USP ad hoc advisory panel for Chapter <1050> revision was assembled with the purpose of updating the chapter to include this missing experimental detail. The panel went through each section of the existing chapter and added the detail that was felt to be lacking. This was done with the overall mandate to avoid introducing any new language that might conflict with the original language (and ICH Q5A Rl). The revised Chapter <1050> was published in the Pharmacopeial Forum in 2010. Responses obtained indicated that there was reluctance to modify in any way the language of this chapter without also modifying ICH Q5A. The situation as of February 2011 was described in an earlier posting.

As a result, the USP decided to keep Chapter <1050> intact and identical to ICH Q5A Rl.  A new ad hoc advisory panel was assembled with the purpose of producing a new chapter in the general information series that would be a companion to the existing Chapter <1050>. The new chapter received the number 1050.1 and provided the vehicle for adding the desired methodological detail.

The proposed new General Chapter <1050.1>, entitled "Design, Evaluation, and Characterization of Viral Clearance Procedures" consists of some background information on process evaluation and process characterization, then launches into experimental design for evaluating both inactivation and removal steps. The latter section includes some specific experimental design flow charts addressing virus removal by filtration and chromatography and virus inactivation. Along with the flow charts describing the design of the studies are description of the methods used to assess potential cytotoxicity or interference caused by the process materials themselves.

The subheadings of the background information are shown in the text box below.

The information presented under these subheadings reflects the panel's understanding of current regulatory expectations. Regulatory input obtained during the public comment period will assure that the panel's perceptions were correct. Discrepancies will be corrected as required.

Finally, a goal of the new chapter was to provide an updated list of the types of viruses that have been and may be used in viral clearance evaluations. For studies enabling clinical trials, it is common for evaluations to use a parvovirus such as MMV and a retrovirus such as X-MuLV as models. This provides a small non-enveloped virus to challenge filtration steps, as well as an enveloped virus to assess inactivation steps designed for lipid enveloped viruses. For BLA enabling studies, a few additional viruses may be selected from this updated list, keeping in mind that the viruses should represent a diversity of characteristics (envelope status, genome type, size, etc.).

The intention of the new chapter <1050.1> is that manufacturer’s may use the methods as appropriate to their own processes and will be able to cite the guidance in their descriptions of the study design. At the present time, no guidance having sufficient experimental design descriptions is available to cite in this respect. The planned date for publication of the proposed chapter in the Pharmacopeial Forum is January 2013.

Porcine circoviruses, vaccines, and trypsin

By Dr. Ray Nims

It has now been more than a year since the announcements by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Merck of the presence of porcine circovirus (PCV) genomic material in their rotavirus vaccines.

The presence of the PCV viral sequences was, in both cases, provisionally attributed to the use of porcine trypsin during the culture of the cell substrates used in the manufacture of the vaccines. It has been reported that the genomic sequences were associated with low levels of infectious PCV in the GSK vaccine.     

As mentioned in a previous posting, an expected outcome of these disclosures was heightened regulatory expectations, going forward, for PCV screening of porcine raw materials and of Master and Working cell banks which were exposed to porcine ingredients (e.g., trypsin) at some point in their development. In January of 2011, the European Pharmacopoeia (Ph. Eur.) chapter 5.2.3 Cell substrates for production of vaccines for human use was revised to include the following instruction: “Trypsin used for the preparation of cell cultures is examined by suitable methods and shown to be sterile and free from mycoplasmas and viruses, notably pestiviruses, <circoviruses> and parvoviruses.” The addition of circoviruses to the list of viruses of concern (previously, mainly bovine viral diarrhea virus and porcine parvovirus) in Ph. Eur. 7.2 was not unexpected, based on the rotavirus vaccine experience.

A more broad expectation going forward may also be that vaccine and biologics production cell banks be proactively screened for unexpected, perhaps previously undetectable, viruses using detection techniques such as the deep sequencing used initially to detect the PCV in the GSK rotavirus vaccine. A related technique referred to as massively parallel sequencing (Massively Parallel Sequencing (MP-Seq), a New Tool For Adventitious Agent Detection and Virus Discovery) has been adopted for detection of viral contaminants in cells and viral seed stocks and for evaluating vaccine cell substrates by the contract testing organization BioReliance.

The more important sequella of the porcine circovirus disclosures may therefore be the proactive use of these new and powerful virus detection techniques for ensuring the viral safety of production cell banks, going forward.

The nuts and bolts of retrovirus safety testing

by Dr. Ray Nims


Retroviruses may integrate into the genome of host animals. For this reason they are often referred to as endogenous viruses. Viral particles may or may not be expressed in the host cell. Expressed viruses may be infectious or non-infectious, and infectious virus may have tropism for (ability to infect) the same or different animal species relative to the host cell of origin. Infection results from a process of reverse transcription of the viral RNA leading to proviral DNA. To accomplish this, retroviruses have a specialized enzyme known as reverse transcriptase. Through this process (see figure below), the infected cell may be enlisted to produce viral progeny. Certain of the retroviruses are known to be oncogenic (e.g., human T-lymphotropic virus 1, feline leukemia virus, Raus sarcoma virus, etc.). Other retroviruses are of concern as a result of disease syndromes caused in humans (e.g., human immunodeficiency virus 1 in acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, and the possible role of xenotropic murine leukemia virus-related virus in chronic fatigue syndrome). From a biosafety standpoint, there is a worry that under some conditions, integrated viruses in cell substrates employed to produce biopharmaceuticals which do not normally express their presence may be induced to produce infectious particles.

Source: AccessExcellence

Retrovirology safety testing for biologics manufacture can be confusing to those not familiar with the subject. Here is a brief overview.

Demonstrating retroviral safety typically involves a combination of the following three components:
• detecting infectious retrovirus through cell culture assays (XC plaque, cocultivation with mink lung or Mus dunni cells, etc.).
• measuring reverse transcriptase enzyme activities either through tritiated thymidine incorporation into templates, or through product amplification (PCR) techniques (PERT, etc.). This is not required if infectious retrovirus is detected.
• Visualizing and enumerating retroviral particles in supernatants or in fixed cells using transmission electron microscopy.

The various assays are applied during cell bank characterization (including end of production cell testing), during evaluation and validation of purification processes, and in some instances, as bulk harvest lot-release assays (results from 3 lots at pilot or commercial scale are submitted with the marketing application). For processes using well-characterized rodent cells known to contain endogenous retrovirus (CHO, C127, BHK, murine hybridoma), retroviral infectivity testing of the processed bulk is not required provided that adequate downstream clearance of the particles has been demonstrated.

Infectivity testing can be particularly confusing, due to the variety of cell-based assays employed. These include both direct and indirect assays. An example of a direct assay is the XC-plaque assay for ecotropic (a term meaning the virus is infectious for mouse cells) murine retroviruses. By definition, therefore, this would only be used to assay production cells of mouse origin.

Indirect assays are those in which a second endpoint is required to assess positive or negative outcome. Indirect assays include the various co-cultivation assays in which the test cells are co-cultivated with host cells such as mink lung, Mus dunni, and any of a number of human cells (see Table 4 within USP <1237> Virology Tests for a list of commonly used host cells). The indirect assays are performed to detect xenotropic retroviruses (retroviruses which are capable of infecting only animals other than the species of origin). The secondary endpoints used to assess outcome include reverse transcriptase activity, sarcoma virus rescue (S+L- focus formation assays), or enzyme immunoassay. The indirect assays are used in the retrovirus testing of mouse, hamster, monkey, and human production cell substrates. The selection of the host cell for the cocultivation assay is dependent upon the species of origin of the production cell, recognizing that cocultivation host cells from a species other than that of the production cells must be used. For production processes using rodent or other non-human cells, one or more human host cells are typically used for the cocultivation assay, as xenotropic retroviruses infectious for human cells are of obvious concern.

Still confused? Don’t worry. An individual with virology testing expertise can assist in designing the appropriate retrovirus testing battery for your biologic.

Assessing rapid mycoplasma detection systems

by Dr. Ray Nims

The European Pharmacopoeia chapter 2.6.7 Mycoplasmas, begining with version 5.8, has provided a mechanism for replacement of the current 28-day culture method for detection of mollicute (mycoplasma and acholeplasma) contaminants in biopharmaceutical bulk harvest samples with more rapid, nucleic acid-based, methods. The US FDA has yet to provide formal guidance on this topic, although it has become clear that the agency is willing to consider such methods, provided that they are shown to be equivalent to or superior to the current approved methods.

For biopharmaceuticals, a satisfactory outcome in a mycoplasma detection assay which is compliant with European Pharmacopoeia 2.6.7 or the 1993 FDA Points to Consider guidance is required on a lot-by-lot basis. Of the various lot-release assays performed on each given lot of a biopharmaceutical, this particular test is typically the most lengthy. Expediting the lot-release process through replacement of the 28-day approved culture test with a rapid mycoplasma detection test is therefore a strong motivating factor for the biopharmaceutical industry.

Figure. The MicroSEQ Mycoplasma assay provides a level of detection less

than 10 CFU/ML.

What options are now available to the industry? Several contract testing laboratories have recently announced the availability of validated rapid mycoplasma assays suitable for biopharmaceutical lot-release. For instance, BioReliance offers a hybrid culture/quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) assay, Charles River Laboratories offers a reverse transcriptase (RT)-PCR assay (BioProcess Int. April 2009, 30-42), Vitrology offers a qPCR assay, and WuXi AppTec offers a “touchdown” PCR assay.

In addition, several vendors are now offering mycoplasma detection kits which will allow biopharmaceutical entities to perform rapid mycoplasma testing in-house. For example, Life Technologies offers the MicroSEQ® Mycoplasma Detection Assay, Roche Applied Science offers the MycoTool™ PCR test and Millipore offers the MilliPROBE® mycoplasma detection system.


It is incumbent upon the biopharmaceutical company to demonstrate comparability between the rapid mycoplasma method and the current approved culture method for each product matrix for which a rapid method is proposed. Guidance on such comparability testing is provided in the European Pharmacopoeia chapter 2.6.7. Comparability studies for rapid methods intended to satisfy the US FDA should be discussed with that agency, as no formal guidance has been published.

What attributes should be considered when selecting a rapid mycoplasma detection method?

1. Sample volume. The current approved culture methods test at least 10 mL of sample. A rapid method intended to replace the current methods should ideally be able to test an equivalent volume of sample. It may be difficult to gain FDA approval for nucleic acid-based methods which can test only microliter amounts of sample.
2. Duration. Hybrid culture/PCR systems may take as long as 14 days to complete, while direct nucleic acid-based methods should be completed within a week or less.
3. Specificity. European Pharmacopoeia 2.6.7 specifies that the nucleic acid test must be able to exclude closely-related bacterial species.
4. Sensitivity. FDA indicates that the rapid method should be equivalent to or better than the approved culture method in terms of sensitivity (limit of detection), based on comparability studies using viable mycoplasma organisms.
5. Orthogonal endpoints. Having two or more orthogonal endpoints is desirable to allow one to discriminate between low level positive and negative signals.
6. Validation status. For contract methods, has the method been validated per European Pharmacopoeia 2.6.7? For kit methods, has the vendor validated the method per European Pharmacopoeia 2.6.7?
7. Drug Master File. For kit methods, has the vendor submitted a drug master file to the FDA for the method?

These considerations should help in deciding among the various options now available for implementing rapid nucleic acid-based mycoplasma testing for biopharmaceutical lot release applications.

Hot Tubs and Bioreactors

By Dr. Ray Nims

Contaminating organisms which most commonly are under the radar for biopharmaceutical manufacturing operations include bacteria, mollicutes (mycoplasmas and acholeplasmas), and viruses. Various in-process and lot-release detection assays are mandated by the FDA and the International Conference on Harmonisation to ensure that such contaminants are detected in bulk harvests and/or final products as part of assuring patient safety (specified in ICH Q5A R1 and the 1993 Points to Consider in the Characterization of Cell Lines used to Produce Biologics). There is, however, an additional group of organisms which may threaten biologics production (one which is not normally associated with such manufacturing activities) namely, the Mycobacterium fortuitum complex.

The what?? The fortuitum complex is a group of relatively rapid-growing (non-tuberculosis) mycobacteria which is more typically associated with hot tub disease, and the contamination of industrial cutting fluids and foot baths used for pedicures. The group includes M. fortuitum, M. chelonae, M. abscessus, M. immunogenum, M. mucogenicum, M. peregrinum, and a few others. These mycobacteria, as well as other groups of non-tuberculosis mycobacteria, can be pathogenic in humans, even those who are immuno-competent. The organisms of the fortuitum complex represent a potential risk to the biopharma industry due to their propensity for forming biofilms, their ability to proliferate in water under relatively low nutrient conditions, their resistance to typical water disinfection methods, and their relatively slow growth in nutrient media.

                    Mycobacteria growing at the liquid/air
                       interface of a growth medium.


These characteristics render the organisms capable of existing in water piping and other surfaces in contact with water or aqueous media. Their slow growth in nutrient media may result in these agents being overlooked in biopharmaceutical manufacturing operations, especially when surveillance methods such as short-term bioburden assays are employed. A few cases of contaminated vaccines and tissue extracts have been reported in the literature (Mycobacterium chelonei in abscesses after injection of diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus-polio vaccine. Am. Rev. Respir. Dis. 1973 Jan; 107:1-8; Abscesses due to Mycobacterium abscessus linked to injection of unapproved alternative medication. Emerg. Inf. Dis. 1999; 5: 681-687).

Are there other examples? It is, unfortunately, difficult to estimate the frequency of occurrence of mycobacterial contamination in biologics manufacturing, since many episodes may lead to premature bioreactor termination, with little evidence to implicate a mycobacterium. It is also likely that episodes may have occurred without being reported in the literature.

USP 63 Mycoplasma Update

By Dr. Ray Nims

The United States Pharmacopeia’s (USP) new chapter <63> Mycoplasma Tests was planned to become effective on May 1, 2010 as part of USP 33. This new chapter was intended to fill a void in the USP for mycoplasma testing, which had been addressed previously within the FDA’s 1993 Points to Consider in the Characterization of Cell Lines Used to Produce Biologicals and the European Pharmacopoeia (EP) chapter 2.6.7 Mycoplasmas (a separate document applying only to mycoplasma testing of live and inactivated viral vaccines, 21 CFR 610.30 will not be considered here). Since there were some methodological differences between the FDA guidance and the EP chapter, it was hoped by the industry that the USP guidance would serve to harmonize mycoplasma testing as much as practically possible.

Indeed, a quick look at the new USP chapter <63> indicates that the chapter was based in large part on EP chapter 2.6.7. A comparison of the three documents (USP, FDA, and EP) reveals methodological differences in only a few areas. These include the assessment of nutritive properties of the solid growth media (agar) used for mycoplasma testing, the assessment of inhibitory substances in the test material, the incubation temperature ranges to be used, and the number of positive controls to be used.

The EP chapter 2.6.7 states that “The solid medium complies with the test if adequate growth is found for each test micro-organism (growth obtained does not differ by a factor greater than 5 from the value calculated with respect to the inoculum)”. There is a different requirement within USP chapter <63>: “The solid medium complies with the test if a count within a 0.5-log unit range of the inoculate amount is found for each test microorganism”. Assuming an inoculate of 100 colony forming units (CFU), the acceptable ranges for the recovered organisms would be 32-316 CFU for the USP version vs 20-500 CFU for the EP version. The USP version is therefore more stringent in this respect.

Similarly, for the assessment of inhibitory substances, EP chapter 2.6.7 states that “…if plates directly inoculated with the product to be examined have fewer than 1/5 of the number of colonies of those inoculated without the product to be examined” there are inhibitory substances in the test material. The USP version indicates that there are inhibitory substances “…if plates directly inoculated with the test article/material are not within a 0.5-log unit range of the number of colonies of those inoculated without the test article/material.” So the USP version is again more stringent in this respect.

Minor differences in incubation temperature for test cultures exist between the documents (36 ± 1°C for the USP and PTC documents vs 35-38°C for the EP chapter). The USP and PTC documents specify the number and types of positive controls to be used in the assays: at least two known Mycoplasma species or strains should be included as positive controls (one a dextrose fermenter and one an arginine hydrolyzer). The EP chapter specifies that at least one of the six Mycoplasma species listed in the chapter be used as a positive control.

The USP chapter <63> differs from EP chapter 2.6.7 also in that the former does not provide requirements for validation of a nucleic acid-based test for mycoplasma. The USP chapter mentions the possibility of replacing the culture method with an alternative (nucleic-acid or enzymatic) method, stating that the alternative method must be validated and shown to be comparable to the agar/broth and cell culture methods. The EP chapter laid the foundation for validation of a nucleic acid-based mycoplasma detection test for the first time in version 5.8 (effective July 2007). This provided the industry with expectations for implementation of a rapid alternative test to the approved culture test for mycoplasma, which is 28 days in duration. Similar guidance is not yet forthcoming from the FDA or USP.

The issues of nutritive properties and inhibitory substances are not addressed within the FDA’s 1993 Points to Consider guidance. In order to now be compliant with the FDA and EP requirements as well as the new USP chapter, testing labs will have to make adjustment within their protocols to account for the stricter USP criteria for assessing nutritive properties and inhibitory substances. Due to errors within some of the monographs to appear in the issuance of the USP to become effective May 1, 2010, this issuance of USP 33, including chapter <63>, was retracted in January of 2010. However, it will be re-issued in March 2010 with an official date six months after reissue, and the methodological differences may need to be accounted for in testing protocols used by quality control laboratories for which USP compliance is applicable.

Once this chapter becomes effective, the mycoplasma test methods described will be considered compendial, meaning that labs following the methods outlined in the chapter will not be required to perform method validation. The labs will only be required to perform method verification for each test sample type (matrix qualification) per USP <1226>.

Eliminating those Pesky Viruses

By Dr. Ray Nims

As part of mitigating the risk of introducing viral contaminants into a product during manufacturing, biopharma companies must assess the overall risk from a variety of sources (cell substrate, animal-derived raw materials, upstream and downstream processes, etc.) and consider options for reducing such risk. For global submissions, this requirement is formalized within EP 5.1.7 Viral Safety. For domestic submissions, such risk assessment and mitigation is consistent with the philosophy of the US FDA as formalized within the 1993 Points to Consider in the Characterization of Cell Lines Used to Produce Biologicals; and ICH Q5A (R1) Viral Safety Evaluation of Biotechnology Products Derived From Cell Lines of Human or Animal Origin. 

A photomicrograph of the HIV virus from the CDC

The following options are available for reducing the risk of introducing a virus during manufacture of a biological product:

• Selection of a cell substrate with low inherent viral risk, and adequate characterization of the manufacturing cell substrate will reduce the risk associated with this important reagent.

• Elimination of the use of animal-derived raw materials and excipients will greatly reduce the risk of introduction of a virus, but of course this is not always possible.

• Where it is necessary to use an animal-derived material (ADM) in the manufacturing process, the following steps should be taken: (1) evaluate the viral risk associated with the ADM; (2) mitigate the viral risk through sourcing strategies, quality control testing at the source and/or at the biopharma, and implementation, where possible, of viral inactivation treatment (e.g., gamma-irradiation) of the ADM.

• Once an ADM has been incorporated into a reagent such as a culture medium, the reagent itself may be subjected to viral inactivation strategies such as UVC-treatment or high-temperature short-time (HTST) treatment.

• Avoidance of the use of open-vessel operations during upstream processes, as they provide entrance points for viruses.

• Implementation of in-process and lot release viral detection tests to provide early indications of a viral infection in an upstream process.

• Implementation and characterization of robust and efficacious viral purification strategies during downstream processing of the biologic.

It is an expectation of the regulatory agencies that each biopharma will employ a combination of the above options in order to assure the viral safety of their biological products. If a viral contamination event should occur during a manufacturing run, it should be thoroughly investigated, with the aim of identifying the source(s) of the contamination. The information learned during the course of investigation should be used to eliminate the source of the contamination, and mitigate the risk of any future similar recurrences of the contamination.

What cell line is this anyway?

By Dr. Ray Nims

For about as long as scientists have been using cell cultures in biomedical research, there have been cases of cell line misidentification. This has been especially true for continuous cell lines, with the increased probability over time of mislabeling or cross-contamination. The primary cross-contaminant historically has been HeLa, a human cervical carcinoma cell which, given the opportunity, could outgrow most other cells in culture. More recently, the use of feeder cells for the propagation of human stem cells, and the use of xenografting for the propagation of human tumor cells, has provided additional opportunities for cell line cross-contamination and misidentification.


In the past, confirmation of cell line species of origin has been the main approach for authenticating cell lines. This was done initially by karyotyping or by immunological techniques, but more recently it has been done through the technique of isoenzyme analysis. An example of an isoenzyme analysis is shown below for Peptidase B and Aspartate Aminotransferase.  These agarose gels show a positive control, a negative control (this is the band that does not line up with the others), the test article and a standard extract.  These gels confirmed the identity of the test article as mouse derived, as expected. 

Isoenzyme analysis has the advantage that it is rapid, not very technically demanding, and may be used not only to confirm species of origin but also to detect the presence of a cross-contaminating cell if the latter is present in the culture at 10% or greater (Nims et al., Sensitivity of Isoenzyme Analysis for the Detection of Interspecies Cell Line Cross-Contamination. In Vitro Cell. Dev. Biol.-Animal 34:35-39, 1998). In fact, isoenzyme analysis is currently the primary method employed within the biopharmaceutical industry for cell line authentication in satisfaction of 1993 Points to Consider and ICH Q5D guidance.

Recent advances in molecular diagnostic techniques have made possible the authentication of human cell lines to the individual level. DNA fingerprinting technologies have matured to the point that some of them, especially single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) typing and single tandem repeat (STR) profiling, are now considered to be viable options for standardizing human cell authentication (see ATCC SDO newsletter article, page 5. For both human and animal cells, DNA fingerprinting provides a means of determining authenticity to the individual level. However, the primary drawback is that the fingerprinting techniques as routinely performed will be less or not at all useful for detecting interspecies cocultivations or cross-contaminations. For this purpose, it may be necessary to retain isoenzyme analysis as part of the authentication armament even when the molecular technologies become the definitive authentication practices for human and animal cell lines.