Ridding serum of viruses with gamma irradiation: part 1

by Dr. Ray Nims

Blood serum, while at times required as a medium component for cell growth in vitro, is an animal-derived material that can introduce contaminating viruses such as Cache Valley virus, REO virus, vesivirus, and epizootic hemorrhagic disease virusinto a biological product. If animal serum must be used in upstream manufacturing processes, the risk of introducing a virus may be mitigated by gamma irradiation of the frozen serum prior to use. How effective is this treatment, and against which viruses?

To answer this question, I have surveyed the literature from the past two decades. A number of investigations have been conducted and the results are in the public domain. The most useful of these studies have examined the dose-response relationships for viral inactivation (rendering of the virus as non-infectious) by gamma irradiation.

In the table below, I have assembled the results obtained for 7 viruses, including four that might be expected to be found in bovine serum: (bovine viral diarrhea virus [BVDV], infectious bovine rhinotracheitis virus [IBR], respiratory-enteric orphan virus [REO virus], and parainfluenza type 3 virus [PI3]). The other three (canine adenovirus, porcine parvovirus [PPV], and mouse minute virus [MMV]), while perhaps not expected to be found in bovine serum, have been studied as model viruses for the adenovirus and parvovirus families (click on table to enlarge).

The efficacy of gamma irradiation for viral inactivation is reported as log10 reduction in titer per kGy, rather than the more commonly employed D10 (Mrad dose required to reduce the titer by 1 log10), as I find the former value to be more useful. To estimate the effectiveness of a given dose of gamma radiation for inactivation of a virus, just multiply the dose in kGy by the log10 reduction in titer per kGy value from the table. The result is the number of logs of inactivation estimated to be achieved for that virus at that radiation dose.

These data tell us that the mid- to large-sized viruses BVDV, IBR, PI3, REO, and CAV should be readily inactivated at the gamma radiation doses normally applied to frozen serum for risk mitigation (25-45 kGy). On the other hand, the two parvoviruses, PPV and MMV, are more difficult to inactivate, presumably due to their small size. Parvoviruses are often used to challenge viral removal and inactivation processes due to their size and lack of an envelope. Higher kGy dose levels may increase the effectiveness of inactivation for these viruses, although at such levels the performance of the animal serum being irradiated may be adversely impacted.

Gamma-irradiation can effectively mitigate the risk of introducing other potential contaminants of bovine serum, including Cache Valley virus, blue tongue virus, and epizootic hemorrhagic disease virus. Like the parvoviruses, however, other relatively small non-enveloped viruses of the calicivirus, picornavirus, polyomavirus, and circovirus families may represent cases where gamma irradiation is less effective at the doses normally applied. Other means of mitigating the risk associated with these viruses may need to be considered.

< This information was excerpted in part from Nims, et al. Biologicals (2011) >


Information sources: Daley et al., FOCUS 20(3):86-88, 1998; Wyatt et al. BioPharm 1993: 6(4):34-40; Purtel et al., 2006; Hanson and Foster, Art to Science 16:1-7, 1997; Hyclone Labs Art to Science 12(2): 1-6, 1993; Gauvin and Nims 2010; Plavsic et al. BioPharm 2001: 14(4):32-36.

Rapid Identification of Viral Contaminants, Finally

By Ray Nims, Ph.D.


There was a time, not long ago, when it might take months to years to identify a viral contaminant isolated from a biological production process or from an animal or patient tissue sample. The identification process took this long because it involved what I have referred to as the “shotgun approach”, or it involved luck.

Let’s start with luck. That is probably the wrong term. What I mean by this is that there have been instances where an informed guess has led to a fairly rapid (i.e., weeks to months) identification of a contaminant. For instance, our group at BioReliance was able to rapidly identify contamination with REO virus (REO type 2 actually) and Cache Valley virus  because we had observed these viruses in culture previously and because these viruses had unique properties (a unique cytopathic effect in the case of REO and a unique growth pattern in the case of Cache Valley virus). The time required to identify these viruses consisted of the time required to submit and obtain results from confirmatory PCR testing for the specific agents.

The first time we ran into Cache Valley virus, however, it was a different story. This was, it turns out, the first time that this particular virus had been detected in a biopharmaceutical bulk harvest sample. In this case, we participated in the “shotgun approach” that was applied to the identification of the isolate. The “shotgun approach” consisted of utilizing any detection technique available at the lab, namely, in vitro screening, bovine screening, application of any immunofluorescent stains available, and transmission electron microscopy (TEM). The TEM was helpful, as it indicated a 80-100 nm virus with 7-9 nm spikes. A bunyavirus-specific stain showed positive, and eventually (after months of work), sequencing and BLAST alignment was used to confirm the identity of the virus as Cache Valley virus.

The “shotgun approach” was subsequently applied to a virus isolated from harbor seal tissues, with no identity established as a result. After approximately a year of floundering using the old methods, the virus was eventually found to be a new picornavirus (Seal Picornavirus 1).  How was this accomplished? During the time between the identification of the Cache Valley virus and the seal virus, a new technology called deep sequencing became available. Eric Delwart’s group used the technique to rapidly identify the virus to the species level. As this was the first time this particular picornavirus had ever been detected, deep sequencing is likely the only method that would have been able to make the identification.

Deep (massively parallel) sequencing is one of a few new technologies that will make virus isolate identification routine and rapid in the future. It has been adopted for detection of viral contaminants in cells and viral seed stocks and for evaluating vaccine cell substrates by BioReliance.The other is referred to as the T5000 universal biosensor. Houman Dehghani’s group at Amgen has been characterizing this methodology as a rapid identification platform for adventitious agent contaminations.  Each technology has its advantages. Deep sequencing is more labor intensive, but has the ability to indicate (as described above) a new species. The universal biosensor can both serve as a detection method and as an identification method. Both can identify multiple contaminants within a sample.

Since identification of an adventitious viral contaminant of a biopharmaceutical manufacturing process is required for establishment of root cause, for evaluating effectiveness of facility cleaning procedures and viral purification procedures, and for assuring safety of both workers and patients, it is critical that the identification of a viral isolate is completed accurately and rapidly. Happily, we now have the tools at hand to accomplish this.

Manufacturing Biologics with CHO Cells? What’s the Risk for Viral Contamination?

by Dr. Ray Nims

Chinese hamster ovary (CHO) cells are frequently used in the biopharmaceutical industry for the manufacture of biologics such as recombinant proteins, antibodies, peptibodies, and receptor ligands. One of the reasons that CHO cells are often used is that these cells have an extensive safety track record for biologics production. This is considered to be a well-characterized cell line, and as a result the safety testing required may be less rigorous in some respects (e.g., retroviral safety) than that required for other cell types. But how susceptible is the cell line to viral contamination?

There are a couple of ways of answering this question. One way is to examine, in an empirical fashion, the susceptibility of the cell type to productive infection by model exogenous viruses. This type of study has been conducted at least three times over the past decades by different investigators. Wiebe and coworkers (In: Advances in Animal Cell Biology and Technology for Bioprocesses. Great Britain, 1989; 68-71) examined over 45 viruses from 9 virus families for ability to infect CHO-K1 cells, using immunostaining and cytopathic effect to detect infection. Only 7 of the viruses (Table 1) were capable of infecting the cells. Poiley and coworkers (In Vitro Toxicol. 4: 1-12, 1991) followed with a similar study in which 9 viruses from 6 families were evaluated for ability to infect CHO-K1 cells as detected by cytopathic effect, hemadsorption, and hemagglutination. This study did not add any new viruses to the short list (Table 1). The most recent study was conducted by Berting et al. This study involved 14 viruses from 12 families. The viruses included a few known to have contaminated CHO cell-derived biologics in the past two decades, and therefore did add some new entities to the list in Table 1. Still, the list of viruses that are known to replicate in CHO cells is relatively short.

Chinese hamster cells possess an endogenous retrovirus which expresses its presence in the form of retroviral particles, however these particles have been consistently found to be non-infectious for cells from other animals, including human cells. This endogenous retrovirus therefore does not present a safety threat (Dinowitz et al. Dev. Biol. Stand. 76:210–207, 1992).

A second way of looking at the question of viral susceptibility of CHO cells is to examine the incidence and types of reported viral contaminations of manufacturing processes employing CHO cell substrates. This subject has been reviewed a number of times, most recently by Berting et al. The types of viral contaminants fill a fairly short list (Table 2). In most cases, the contaminations have been attributed to the use of a contaminated animal-derived raw material, such as bovine serum.

Sources: Rabenau et al.1993; Garnick 1996; Oehmig et al., 2003; Nims Dev. Biol. 123:153-164, 2006; Nims et al., 2008; Genzyme 2009..

Considering the frequency with which CHO cell substrates have been used in biologics production, this history of viral contamination is remarkably sparse. This is further testament to the overall safety of this particular cell substrate.

Can Cache Valley Virus Trash Your Manufacturing?

By Dr. Ray Nims

Cache Valley virus is a single-stranded RNA virus of family bunyavirus, genus Bunyavirus. It is enveloped and nominally 80-120 nm in diameter. Cache Valley virus was first isolated in Utah in 1956 and is carried by mosquitoes. It has since been found to be a widespread virus, having been isolated in Texas, Michigan, North Carolina, Indiana, Virginia and Maryland, for example.

source: Nims et al., BioPharm. Int. 21: 89-94, 2008

Basis of Concern. Cache Valley virus is known to infect livestock, causing birth defects. There have been two reports of encephalitic disease in humans attributed to Cache Valley virus. This virus has been isolated from biologics manufacturing processes employing Chinese hamster cell substrates on a number of occasions from 2000 to 2004 (Nims et al., BioPharm. Int. 21: 89-94, 2008). The route of entry of the virus into biologics production processes has not been established with certainty, although the use of contaminated bovine serum is considered to be the most likely source. Thus far the virus has only been known to infect manufacturing processes employing bovine serum.

Regulatory Expectations. Cache Valley virus is not mentioned specifically in any regulatory guidance, as the detection of this virus in biologics production has been reported only within the past decade. It is the intent of the guidance, however, that occurrences of viral contamination in biologics manufacturing be dealt with through implementation of specific testing methods as required to assure detection of future recurrences (e.g., ICH Q5A R1). In addition, it is expected that the route of entry of the virus be established and that the process be remediated so that future recurrences are prevented where possible (e.g., 1997 Points to Consider in the Manufacture and Testing of Monoclonal Antibody Products for Human Use).

Mitigating Risk. Although many Contract Testing laboratories offer rapid nucleic acid-based detection assays for Cache Valley virus, raw material screening for this virus using such assays does not appear to be a viable means of eliminating risk. The industry experience thus far indicates that Cache Valley virus may be a low level, non-homogeneous contaminant of bovine serum. Viral screening performed on one bottle out of a large lot of serum therefore is no guarantee that this virus will not be encountered. Elimination of animal-derived materials (esp. bovine serum) from the manufacturing process may help to reduce the risk of experiencing this virus. Should this not be possible, treatment of the serum or serum-containing media should be considered. Gamma-irradiation has been demonstrated to be effective in inactivating this virus in bovine serum (Gauvin, 2009). UVC treatment of media containing bovine serum also appears to be quite effective at inactivating Cache Valley virus (Weaver, 2009).

Conclusions. Cache Valley virus infects livestock and has been found to contaminate biologics manufacturing processes employing bovine serum. It is a virus of concern for biologics manufacturers employing bovine serum which has not been gamma-irradiated. Risk of infection of biological products with Cache Valley virus through use of bovine serum may be mitigated through implementation of gamma-irradiation of the serum, or UVC- or high-temperature short-time (HTST) treatment of media containing the serum and of viral purification processes capable of removing and inactivating enveloped viruses.